



The Evolution of Risk Mitigation in Flight Test for Complex Systems

A Brief History for Tomorrow

Enlightenment From 4 Decades

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My Journey...

tutti i passi che ho fatto nella mia vita
mi hanno portato qui, ora
every step I have taken in my life
has led me here, now



F-35 Japan

F-16



Pilot Blamed for Deadly F-16 Crash
January 4, 2024

F-16 Block 60




F-16
Super
Viper



F-35

DT&E



F-35 Italy



F-16IN Super Viper

MMRCA F-16IN Flight Trials



A-12 Avenger



F-4 Phantom



India

India Flight Trials (Phase I & II) 2-16 Sep 2009



Risk Awareness



ORACLE® FTRT



VF-202 "SUPERHEATS"
F-14A TOMCAT



MMRCA



STAMP/STPA




F-14 Tomcat



UK-Exchange

1978



1984



AFLC

1988



1992



1995



2008



2012

2021





The Experiences that Enlightened my Flight Safety Awareness



F-35 Japan

F-16 Super Viper



F-35 DT&E




F-35 Italy



Pilot Blamed for Deadly F-16 Crash

January 4, 1994

India India Flight Trials (Phase I & II) 2-16 Sep2009



MMRCA



Risk Awareness



STAMP/STPA



1994

2008

2012

2021

MMRCA (India) Flight Demonstrations (Palmdale Calif)




Traditional Risk Matrix is Not Sufficient

RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX				
SEVERITY PROBABILITY	Catastrophic (1)	Critical (2)	Marginal (3)	Negligible (4)
Frequent (A)	High	High	Serious	Medium
Probable (B)	High	High	Serious	Medium
Occasional (C)	High	Serious	Medium	Low
Remote (D)	Serious	Medium	Medium	Low
Improbable (E)	Medium	Medium	Medium	Low
Eliminated (F)	Eliminated			

Figure 1: A standard risk matrix from MIL-STD-882E.

Can be Counterproductive

“Statistical science models can tell you something about normal events, but they cannot deal with unexpected, high-impact events.” Dr. Nassim Taleb



- A Surprise (to the observer)
- Major Impact
- Rationalized by Hindsight



“Fooled by Randomness”

“We don't understand the world as well as we think we do and tend to be fooled by false patterns, mistake luck for skills, overestimate knowledge about rare events (Black Swans), as well as human understanding, something that has been getting worse with the increase in complexity...”

Dr. Nassim Taleb – April 11, 2011, *Fortune*


4 Strategies for Mitigating Flight Test 'Black Swans' drawn from Dr. Nassim Taleb's "10 Principles"

1. No Incentives Without Disincentives
2. *Everyone Bears Some Responsibility*
3. *Every Captain should go down with every ship*
4. *Counter-balance complexity with simplicity. Complex systems survive thanks to slack and redundancy*




Growing Challenge - Complexity!


Systems




Software



Organizations (Processes)



Complexity Impact in Flight Test



2019 Flight Test Safety Workshop - Wickert

Complexity Impact in the Operational World

Examples of Accidents Where Software Operated “As Designed”

2018 Boeing 737 Max
NBC News.com



Control Systems
Operated
Exactly as
Designed!

Distracted pilot & flight control logic glitch



Airforcetimes.com

Asiana B777 – Auto-Throttle Doesn’t Advance



© Copyright John Thomas 2020

Learjet 60–Computer Ignored Pilot Commands



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


The problem is that we are attempting to build systems that are beyond our ability to intellectually manage: Increased interactive complexity and coupling make it difficult for the designers to consider all the potential system states or for operators to handle all normal and abnormal situations and disturbances safely and effectively.”

from *Engineering a Safer World* by Professor Nancy Leveson
Dir of MIT Partnership for Systems Approaches to Safety & Security



Barham & Hughes-“Why Flight Test Is Distinctively Complex”



Employ Cynefin for Effective & Safer Flight Test Operations

Flight Test Operations Reside Mostly in the Complex Domain.

In the Complex Domain

Employ pattern recognition and principles vice analysis & rules.

Experiences, Storytelling, Mentoring & Airmanship are Key to Pattern Recognition

Recognize Engineers & Managers operate in different domains

Cynefin Framework Context Domains

Complex

Cause--(non-linear)---Effect
Right answers can't be ferreted out
Cause & effect discerned in hindsight
Unknown-Unknowns
Emergence of Patterns
Experience & Story telling
Probe, Sense and Respond

Complicated

Cause----(analysis)----->Effect
Expertise Necessary
Known-Unknowns
Good Practice (range of solutions)
Simplify and solve
Sense, Analyze and Respond

Chaotic

Cause - Effect impossible to determine
Realm of the Unknowable
No Discernible Patterns
Crisis Management
Do Something (moves the problem into different context)
Act, Sense, and Respond

disorder


Simple

Cause = Effect Clear Relationship
Stability
Known-Knowns
Best Practice (a solution)
Sense, Categorize, and Respond

A Leader's Framework for Decision Making
David J. Snowden and Mary E. Boone
Harvard Business Review • November 2007


Figure 1 Cynefin Framework Context Domains

Moving Safety Mindset from Linear “Event Oriented Thinking to Systems Thinking”



Systems Thinking


Thinks in loop structure



In systems thinking a system's behavior emerges from the structure of its feedback loops. **Root causes** are not individual nodes. They are the forces emerging from particular feedback loops.

Created by Thwink.org

2018 Wickert - Risk Awareness: A New Framework for Risk Management




- 2 Factors Characterize Risk
- Understand domain you are operating in
- Be Wary of Probability Estimates
- Employ different strategies & tools based on domain
- **Knowledge is Control Parameter**


Risk Awareness Emerges in Complex Systems and Organizations.

To cultivate risk awareness:


- 1) Identify and characterize the nature of the unknowns
- 2) Reduce the reducible ignorance
- 3) Democratize safety decision making
- 4) Resist drift




3 Approaches - Good But Insufficient



2007



2016



2018

March Issue 20-03

Flight Test *Safety* Fact

Published for the Flight Test Safety Committee

In This Issue
Coffee with Ben and Jeff – A conversation about flight test safety and complexity



Massachusetts Institute of Technology Partnership for Systems Approaches to Safety and Security

Dr. Nancy Leveson and Dr. John Thomas




- Safety Enhancements Focused on Complex, Software Intensive Systems
- STAMP Methodology (Systems Theoretic Accident Model & Process)
- Can Find Missing Requirements & Handle Unknown-Unknowns
- Prescriptive and “Human Centric”

Key STAMP Tenets


For Complex Systems & Organizations:

- Linear Causality Models Are Not Appropriate (Swiss Cheese)
- Using Probability to Assess Risk Can Undermine Safety
- Traditional Safety & Mishap Analysis Tools are Insufficient
- Pilot/Operator error can be a symptom, rather than the cause
- Component Failure is Not the Main Problem
- Address Safety as a Control Problem




STPA - A Rigorous 4 Step

Model Based Systems Engineering Process to Identify & Mitigate Hazards



How-to guide mit.edu/psas







Flight Tester Expertise



“The traditional approach to training and management used with most design engineering disciplines and other program organizations is ineffective and perhaps dangerous when applied to the flight test discipline...”

**Robert Barham & Starr Hughes, – “A Different Perspective Why Flight Test Is Distinctively Complex”
SFTE Tech Council Webinar, June 2016**

Tester Influence Derives from Expertise



- ✓ Holistic Training
- ✓ Ongoing Professional Development
- ✓ Competency Standards
- ✓ Accredited Career Track

SFTE Guideline for Flight Test Engineer (FTE) Qualification FTE Knowledge, Skills, & Abilities Below list reflects FTE subjects & tasks from many organizations. Some items do not apply to some organizations	Recommended credit earning rate, limits, and minimum qualifying credits											
	Entry-Level			Journeyman			Lead		Individual			
	2-yr tech school	2-yr degree	4-yr tech school	Direct Exp. (incl. TPS)	Indirect Experience	Specialized Training via TPS, CEU, In-house	Specialized Training via TPS, CEU, In-house	Direct Exp.	Indirect Exp.	Specialized Training		
	Credit Rate	Credit Rate	Credit Rate	Credit Rate, Limit	Credit Rate, Limit	Credit Limit (1 credit/day)	Credit Limit (1 credit/day)	Qualifying Credits	Qualifying Credits	earned credits		
Write, review, or approve Risk Assessment & Management documents	x	x	x	2/pla	0	0	1	0	2			
Present test plans at Technical Reviews.	x	x	x	2/pla	0	0.2	1	1	2			
Conduct/Support Safety Review Boards or First Flight Readiness Review risk assessment.	x	x	x	2/pla	0	0	1	1	2			

Expertise + Career Track => Influence



“Flight Test Training is Expensive...but it is Good Business”

Airbus VP for Flight Test - Patrick Du Ché

“It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future” Yogi Berra



Real Time Model Based Analysis
Real Time Knowledge Envelopes
Less is More (Big Data)
Machine Learning Pattern Recognition
Augmented Reality Build-Ups
Virtual Reality Training
AI Assistants Control Room



**Exciting Test Opportunities are Coming!
New Methodologies Offer the Potential for
Safer and More Effective Flight Test.
Culture & Tester Influence are Foundational**



Join Me on The Journey – Stay Humble - And Thank you!

Selected References

Contact Jeff Canclini on LinkedIn if Problems Accessing

[Test Safety, Professional Expertise, and Productivity in Flight Test](#) Canclini, SFTE India Symposium Feb 2022 (a deeper dive into this presentation with a comprehensive list of references and links)

[Edwin Snowden Explains the Cynefin Framework](#)

[Why Flight Test Is Distinctively Complex](#) Barham & Hughes

[Risk Awareness: A new framework for Risk Management in Flight Test](#) Wickert

[Introduction to STPA](#) MIT Partnership for Safety and Security

[FTSC Safety Fact 20-03- “A Conversation with Ben and Jeff”](#)

[FTSC Safety Fact 20-03 Editor Mark Jones on the Promise & Peril of Big Data](#)

“Outcome-based Framework For Online Model Validation And Risk Awareness” Jurado & McGehee, 2022 SFTE Symposium & 2021 SETP Symposium