



# **Active Failures**

- Most associated with "front line operators" i.e., pilots, controllers, mechanics
- Consequences known soon after mistake is committed
  - Pilot forgets to lower landing gear
  - Mechanic fails to replace O-rings

### **Latent Conditions**

- Often the result of decisions or actions by management
  - often with good intentions
- Consequences of this decision / action may be not manifested for a period of time
  - decision to merge two airlines without providing training to standardize operating procedures







# Allegheny 1979

"The NTSB determines that the probable cause of the accident was the captain's decision to take off with snow on the aircraft's wing and empennage surfaces..."

(Allegheny Airlines Nord 262, February 12, 1979. Clarksburg, WV)

NTSB 💓

6

## **Icing Accidents**

- February 1979 -Nord 262
- February 1980 -Britannia 253F
- January 1982 -B737

- Allegheny Airlines Clarksburg, WV
- Redcoat Air Cargo Boston, MA
- Air Florida Washington, DC

### Icing Accidents (continued)

- February 1985 DC-9-10
- December 1985 -DC-8
- November 1987 -DC-9-10

Airborne Express Philadelphia, PA

- Arrow Air Gander, Newfoundland
  - Continental Airlines Denver, CO
    - NTSB 🧝








# USAir 405 - 1992

"The NTSB determines that the probable causes of this accident were the <u>failure of the airline</u> industry and the Federal Aviation Administration to provide flightcrews with procedures, requirements, and criteria compatible with departure delays in known icing conditions, and the decision of the flightcrew to take off ..."

NTSB 🧝



# July 10, 2007, Sanford, FL




- Cessna 310 owned by NASCAR
- Flight planned Daytona Beach to Lakeland
- Inflight emergency, request for immediate diversion, crash

NTSB 🧝


• 5 fatalities













# **Active Failures**

#### MECHANIC

• Did not inspect maintenance log or correct the discrepancy

#### **PILOTS**

- ATP dismissed radar issue as unimportant
- Weather radar circuit breaker likely reset for the flight
- Pilots accepted airplane "as is" and departed


## Inadequate Organizational Processes and Procedures


- Maintenance forms not serialized, tracked, or retained
  - Yellow copy never provided
- SOP guidance versus reality
- No assurance discrepancies would be addressed
- Airworthiness status unclear
- No procedures for providing flight operations personnel (pilots and dispatchers) with airplane airworthiness information.

NTSB 💓




- Most often a preflight fact sheet would be taped to airplane with highlighted items signed off by a mechanic
  - Not a requirement, not spelled out in SOP
- No guidance was provided to PIC for determining airworthiness of assigned aircraft





### **Probable Cause**

- Actions and decisions by NASCAR's corporate aviation division's management and maintenance personnel to allow the accident airplane to be released for flight with a known and unresolved discrepancy, and;
- The accident pilots' decision to operate the airplane with that known discrepancy, a discrepancy that likely resulted in an in-flight fire.



# Air Inter A320 Accident

### 9 Survive as Airbus Carrying 96 Crashes in French Hills

Induce The


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
to Strabburg when radio costa about before the uchediald land pm. (1:25 pm. EST), oblicita sectors wreckage was located shortly to sight. The plane carried 80 passorn the


- Strasbourg, France
- January 20, 1992
- 87 fatalities

 
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NTSB 🧝

























### **NTSB** Analysis

"The pilots most likely mistook the fast/slow indicator for the glideslope indicator throughout the approach

sequence."



### **Safety Order of Precedence**

Design for Minimum Risk (engineering solution)

 Hazard is corrected and eliminated
 Control/Guard Solution
 Guards put up to decrease exposure

Personnel Warning System

 Warn personnel if you can't eliminate or control the hazard

Develop Procedures and Training
Source: MIL-STD-882D and FAA System Safety Manual

