1 00:00:00.300 --> 00:00:04.060 This, this should go easily. So, uh, the first presentation, 2 00:00:04.410 --> 00:00:09.260 like Stu said, uh, is going to be instead of, uh, the, 3 00:00:09.280 --> 00:00:14.140 uh, Mike's presentation on the Doo, it'll be the presentation that, uh, Stu and, 4 00:00:14.760 --> 00:00:19.450 uh, Dan Henson are gonna do. And I don't have your bio on here, 5 00:00:19.450 --> 00:00:22.730and I don't if there's a bio for them to bring up. But everybody knows Stu, 6 00:00:22.730 --> 00:00:25.770 who is former Canadian forces tester and pilot, 7 00:00:25.990 --> 00:00:29.800 and now at Textron as safety officer. And Dan, 8 00:00:29.920 --> 00:00:33.080 I don't even know what Dan's current title is because he's probably like one 9 00:00:33.080 --> 00:00:36.720 step below CEO by now, but he used to be used to be the chief pilot for defense. 10 00:00:36.740 --> 00:00:40.920 So, uh, you guys clear to take it away. And please remember, uh, 11 00:00:41.420 --> 00:00:42.720 if there's questions at the end of this, 12 00:00:42.720 -> 00:00:45.840cuz we'll have about five minutes wait till the mic gets to you so that we can

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13 00:00:45.840 --> 00:00:49.200 record it for the, for the, uh, recording, the video recording to doing so. 14 00:00:49.290 --> 00:00:50.600 Thank you. And guys, take it away. 15 00:00:51.760 --> 00:00:52.520 Thanks Dave. 16 00:00:52.520 --> 00:00:53.353 Thanks, Dave. 17 00:00:55.970 --> 00:00:56.260 Does 18 00:00:56.260 --> 00:00:57.093 That go on? 19 00:00:57.560 --> 00:01:00.100 Hey, can you bring up the, uh, note slide on the, uh, 20 00:01:02.970 --> 00:01:07.520 Otherwise we'll be wing it. Oh, sorry. We're gonna be, yeah. All right. 21 00:01:09.350 --> 00:01:12.200 Big green button. Sure. Uh, 22 00:01:13.310 --> 00:01:17.900 There is a process of going through, coming up with a presentation for me. 23 00:01:18.350 --> 00:01:21.010 It comes with the jubilation and glee of signing up for something. 24 00:01:21.010 --> 00:01:24.930 How exciting is that? And then I completely ignore it, then forget about it. 25 00:01:25.270 --> 00:01:29.930

And then there's a buildup of, uh, mild anxiety and then holy crap, you know, 26 00:01:31.040 --> 00:01:34.450 wrenching by, dug up for something. Why did, did I do that 27 00:01:34.450 --> 00:01:39.380 Myself again? Then I can hear you. Oh, sorry. I want to walk away. 28 00:01:39.920 --> 00:01:44.470 So, So when the, uh, the time comes and the muse has to hit you, 29 00:01:44.510 --> 00:01:46.670 I can't really control when that's gonna happen. In this case, 30 00:01:46.670 --> 00:01:48.990 it happened when the grandkids are over. Uh, 31 00:01:48.990 --> 00:01:51.270 I had to rough one of them up and take away his, uh, 32 00:01:51.330 --> 00:01:54.950 his paper and his crayon and write everything down really quickly before it 33 00:01:54.950 --> 00:01:56.910 leaked outta my head. So that's what we have on the right sides, 34 00:01:56.930 --> 00:01:59.870 our presentation. And if there are any, any questions too, and I'll be around, 35 00:02:00.290 --> 00:02:03.970 uh, to take them for you. Uh, more seriously put, uh, 36 00:02:04.110 --> 00:02:06.770 it did start out like that, which is why I put in there thanks to, uh, 37 00:02:06.770 --> 00:02:10.090 to mo for the recommendation on that. Uh, for the slide, the, uh,

38

00:02:10.120 --> 00:02:12.210 what we're gonna go through is, uh, 39 00:02:12.390 --> 00:02:15.290 the story of testing in the baseline modification, 40 00:02:15.310 --> 00:02:18.530 and then we change the outer mold line in this particular, uh, airplane. 41 00:02:18.590 --> 00:02:22.890 And then Stu, uh, appropriately named his event that he'll brief you on. Uh, 42 00:02:22.890 --> 00:02:24.570 well, this sucks. And then, uh, 43 00:02:24.570 --> 00:02:28.010 with all deference to Gerald Tolkin on Unexpected journey. So Stu, 44 00:02:28.190 --> 00:02:29.090 you've got that part. 45 00:02:31.070 --> 00:02:33.290 All right. First of all, I apologize for the graphics. Uh, 46 00:02:33.350 --> 00:02:36.250 we we're eventually gonna change this into a, a beautiful looking King air. 47 00:02:36.250 --> 00:02:39.410 It's not a caravan paper, this is King Air paper, but this is the, uh, 48 00:02:39.960 --> 00:02:43.930 best 3D representation of what happened. So we're out doing some, uh, 49 00:02:43.940 --> 00:02:47.850 power on stall characteristics, light aft, and uh, we are, 50 00:02:47.850 --> 00:02:50.010 just to give an idea of what the king air's like when you're stalling it,

00:02:50.320 --> 00:02:52.610 it's pretty smooth actually with, especially with power on, 52 00:02:52.610 --> 00:02:55.050 you're just pulling back one, not per second, nice smooth pull. 53 $00:02:55.230 \rightarrow 00:02:59.090$ You get a little bit of verbal, uh, little bit right before the stall break. 54 00:02:59.620 --> 00:03:02.480 Bit of a roll off usually, cuz as we usually have the left wing heavy. 55 00:03:02.900 --> 00:03:03.840 And then you, um, 56 00:03:04.700 --> 00:03:07.990 basically then you go into the full stall break two seconds on the stop recover 57 00:03:08.210 --> 00:03:10.630 and the king air, you have to fly it outta the recovery. It's more of a, 58 00:03:10.650 --> 00:03:12.310 if you just slam the the yolk forward, 59 00:03:12.310 --> 00:03:15.110 you'll end up having increasing more roll off usually. So, 60 00:03:15.110 --> 00:03:16.270 but it's generally pretty smooth. 61 00:03:16.930 --> 00:03:21.330 So we were finding some challenges with power on stalls 62 00:03:21.910 --> 00:03:26.290 and, uh, having a tough time getting can be compliant and, but I, 63 00:03:26.370 --> 00:03:29.090 I figured out a technique on the eighth runner. I'm like, oh, this is great.

64 00:03:29.360 --> 00:03:33.890 I've got it, we've nailed it. And uh, then tm of course is, yeah, 65 00:03:33.890 --> 00:03:37.290 that was 1.8 seconds on the stop not to, I was like, well, 66 00:03:37.290 --> 00:03:42.250 I think we got this figured out. So hopefully this starts playing. It is. 67 00:03:43.030 --> 00:03:46.970 So we're like, okay, well I got this done. Let's go ahead and do one more run. 68 00:03:47.230 --> 00:03:50.770 And, uh, if Shakka could hold my beer at that point while we go on for this run, 69 00:03:50.770 --> 00:03:53.730 that'd be perfect. So we're just getting up here. You can see, uh, 70 00:03:53.730 --> 00:03:56.650 just giving a 3D representation of the aircraft as it's, uh, 71 00:03:56.650 --> 00:04:00.010 getting close to the stall break. You can see with the power on stalls, 72 00:04:00.100 --> 00:04:04.790we're about, that's like 67 knots. And we get a little bit of this, 73 00:04:04.790 --> 00:04:08.510 the burble coming in does a nice rapid roll off. 74 00:04:09.950 --> 00:04:12.490 And then it says, I'm gonna go the other direction now too, 75 00:04:12.490 --> 00:04:14.170 and slice off back the other direction. 76 00:04:15.800 --> 00:04:20.740And we end up about 88 degrees nose down going, wow, this sucks.

77 00:04:22.360 --> 00:04:26.120 We recovered the aircraft. Um, we managed to, uh, 78 00:04:26.780 --> 00:04:28.440 get the aircraft recovered with just, uh, 79 00:04:28.440 --> 00:04:31.600 about a end up pulling about 3G on what was a two G aircraft at the time, 80 00:04:31.600 --> 00:04:35.360 about 3.3 in the recovery to avoid hitting the ground. Uh, well not, 81 00:04:35.360 --> 00:04:36.320 we weren't that close to the ground, 82 00:04:36.320 --> 00:04:39.800 but just to get the aircraft recovered and overspeed the, uh, the, 83 00:04:39.860 --> 00:04:43.840 the flaps as well. So we got back home table to your legs, like, okay, 84 00:04:43.840 --> 00:04:48.280 what the hell happened there? So, sure, this moves on. 85 00:04:49.780 --> 00:04:52.550Okay, that was the incident. Back to you. Alright, 86 00:04:52.650 --> 00:04:56.070 Thanks sir. So, big picture wise, I know this is a bit of a busy slide, 87 00:04:56.070 --> 00:04:59.190 but this was the program that we're on and, and just a little bit of a, uh, 88 00:04:59.350 --> 00:05:04.110 a setup for you to get you in the mind that we were, uh, did some initial, uh, 89 00:05:04.110 -> 00:05:06.790testing on the airplane after it was born, so to speak.

90 00:05:06.810 --> 00:05:09.630 And then it went into this, what we call long nose modification. Uh, 91 00:05:09.630 --> 00:05:09.990 if you're not, 92 00:05:09.990 --> 00:05:13.830 I'll show you pictures and then if you see that baseline cert in 20 20 20, 93 00:05:13.830 --> 00:05:17.310 that was for the long nose. And we just proceeded through bumping along, 94 00:05:17.310 --> 00:05:20.550 doing all the different tests that we had to do, uh, to get to that point. 95 00:05:20.550 --> 00:05:22.310 Then we go, okay, let's change this. Uh, 96 00:05:22.360 --> 00:05:25.430 outer mold line is the oml there modification period. 97 00:05:25.490 --> 00:05:28.830 We come out of that and our expectation at this point is to go bump it along, 98 00:05:28.830 --> 00:05:32.390 doing the same thing that we just did. Uh, didn't realize that, uh, 99 00:05:32.710 --> 00:05:34.710 that power installs were going to be an issue. 100 00:05:34.770 --> 00:05:37.910 So they weren't really brought forward in the test program as, uh, 101 00:05:38.050 --> 00:05:41.510 as going after the risk reduction. Now the rest of it is very busy. 102 00:05:41.710 --> 00:05:45.430 I I appreciate that. Flight 1 74 is, uh, is up there.

103 00:05:45.580 --> 00:05:46.870 What Stu just showed you, 104 00:05:47.090 --> 00:05:50.510 the unexpected stall characteristics journey in total is about 30 different 105 00:05:50.510 --> 00:05:53.870 flights and 648 stalls, seven different pilots, 106 00:05:53.870 --> 00:05:55.550 and four different aircraft configurations. 107 00:05:55.890 --> 00:05:59.320 And we went all over the place with exploration before that until we finally 108 00:05:59.320 --> 00:06:02.720 figured out that there's some dependencies we need to start addressing. 109 00:06:02.720 --> 00:06:05.880 And let's try and use handling quality ratings to do so. 110 00:06:07.270 --> 00:06:09.570 So introduce you to the airplane. It's a, uh, 111 00:06:09.570 --> 00:06:13.570 model three 50 or a King Air three 50 is actually beast 300 is the type on it. 112 00:06:13.760 --> 00:06:15.250 This one's been modified, uh, 113 00:06:15.250 --> 00:06:19.530 with the long nose modification to put an MX 20 class, uh, 114 00:06:19.530 --> 00:06:22.610 sensor in the, in the, uh, nose of it up there. Uh, 115 00:06:22.610 --> 00:06:26.890

we're gonna be in pitch attitudes anywhere from 35 to 45 degrees in, uh, 116 00:06:27.070 --> 00:06:31.090 all the way up to 50 alpha was our, uh, or 50 units anyway, 117 00:06:31.090 --> 00:06:33.370 was our knock it off criteria. So kind of important, 118 00:06:33.370 --> 00:06:36.610 especially for your fighter guys in the room to guys and gals in the room to 119 00:06:36.610 --> 00:06:38.210 look underneath there and be thinking, Hey, 120 00:06:38.310 --> 00:06:41.810 what's the underside of the nose look like? That's what it looks like. Anyhow, 121 00:06:41.830 --> 00:06:44.290 the rest of the airplane, we have four bladed props on it. There, 122 00:06:44.310 --> 00:06:48.490 we went back and forth. These are dash 67 alpha engines, uh, 123 00:06:48.730 --> 00:06:51.610 17,500 pound airplane. Uh, as, uh, 124 00:06:51.610 --> 00:06:54.810 as stated here with some other modifications that will show in other pictures. 125 00:06:55.390 --> 00:06:58.730 Our, our basic plan for this outer mold line, uh, 126 00:06:58.750 --> 00:07:00.810 change was to certify that. 127 00:07:01.270 --> 00:07:05.570 And the point underlined is that we were doing it for a customer who we're not

128 00:07:05.570 --> 00:07:09.210 going to name and we're gonna respect by covering up some of the important bits 129 00:07:09.210 --> 00:07:13.090 on the mod, uh, here, but we were not the certification authority. 130 00:07:13.110 --> 00:07:17.010 It was going company data to someone else's certification authority. 131 00:07:17.310 --> 00:07:18.890 We were just looking to finish up this, 132 00:07:18.890 --> 00:07:23.010 gather all the data and provide that and get on with the rest of our lives. 133 00:07:23.750 --> 00:07:27.690 So, uh, ground photo, the baseline oml, this doesn't give you much I, I know, 134 00:07:27.690 --> 00:07:31.170 but I was having fun with, uh, with PowerPoint and blocking stuff out and said, 135 00:07:31.170 --> 00:07:33.890 yeah, I think I could do that. So I figured I'd show it to you. So there you go. 136 00:07:34.000 --> 00:07:36.490 It's, uh, on the bell of the airplane, it's also on the top of the tail. 1.37 00:07:36.490 --> 00:07:39.130 Great out there. And, uh, you can, uh, 138 00:07:39.390 --> 00:07:41.530 get a different perspective for the airplane here. 139 00:07:41.750 --> 00:07:44.730 You can see the boxes a little bit longer, so it must be a longer, uh,

00:07:44.730 --> 00:07:47.490 type of mod. It's also a good shot of the bell of the airplane, 141 00:07:47.490 --> 00:07:51.210 particularly those, uh, maritime configuration, large ventral strikes, 142 00:07:51.300 --> 00:07:56.250 which is helping us with directional control or stability, I should say. 143 00:07:56.700 --> 00:07:59.740Alrighty, I think this is back to you for slacking, that part. 144 00:08:00.970 --> 00:08:03.270 Thanks Shakka. Okay, so let's talk a little bit about, uh, 145 00:08:03.270 --> 00:08:06.190 as we mentioned we're, um, certification basis. So it's, 146 00:08:06.190 --> 00:08:10.070 we're collecting certification, data development data for a customer, 147 00:08:10.630 --> 00:08:12.270 a foreign customer who is then good, 148 00:08:12.270 --> 00:08:16.440 but wants to use the FA rules as their baseline for how they're gonna comply 149 00:08:16.440 --> 00:08:20.440 with the, the aircraft. So let's talk a little bit about amendment levels. So, 150 00:08:21.500 --> 00:08:24.600 and specifically the stalls on the part 23 world for this is obviously the King 151 00:08:24.600 --> 00:08:25.960 air has been around for a while as an older cert basis. 152 00:08:26.380 - > 00:08:30.200So standard 50 degrees of Roland. Yah, that's what you're looking for. Uh,

153 00:08:30.200 --> 00:08:31.760 and of course that one wonderful caveat, 154 00:08:31.870 --> 00:08:33.920 without requiring exceptional pilot skill, 155 00:08:33.920 --> 00:08:36.680 which for those who are familiar with 25, it's must be possible to, 156 00:08:36.980 --> 00:08:40.200 and this one has this caveat that it's gotta be no exceptional pilot, 157 00:08:40.200 --> 00:08:42.720 which is a very big difference when you're talking about things like this. 158 00:08:44.830 --> 00:08:48.530 Now for power on stalls, um, if you go back to the original amendment level, 159 00:08:48.530 --> 00:08:49.410 amendment 50, 160 00:08:50.280 --> 00:08:55.160 it's 75% power or powerful level flight in the landing 161 00:08:55.400 --> 00:08:58.390 configuration. Uh, but gotta be at least 50%. 162 00:08:59.130 --> 00:09:03.430 Now this rule was really written back in the days of pistons when I didn't have 163 00:09:03.430 --> 00:09:08.270 the amount of excess power that most modern turbo props can produce. Um, 164 00:09:08.730 --> 00:09:09.990 so really they gave you, 165 00:09:09.990 --> 00:09:12.790

at least it gave you a caveat that you can pull the power back from 75% and go 166 00:09:12.790 --> 00:09:14.910 to 50%. But that's still an awful lot of power. 167 00:09:15.330 --> 00:09:19.470 And the deck angles you create doing these kind of maneuvers are really extreme 168 00:09:19.620 --> 00:09:21.870 because of the amount of excess power that we have. I, 169 00:09:21.870 --> 00:09:23.790 when you think we're light aft doing the stall characteristics, 170 00:09:23.790 --> 00:09:28.030 it can climb like a bane. So, um, but if you look at Amendment 62, 171 00:09:28.030 --> 00:09:28.863 you can see the, 172 00:09:28.890 --> 00:09:33.270 the rules are maturing and recognizing the fact that this is getting silly with 173 00:09:33.270 --> 00:09:36.910 this amount of power on these aircraft. Um, so we gave you a better caveat. 174 00:09:37.090 --> 00:09:39.950 And the biggest thing is, yeah, you're now, you got the gear up, 175 00:09:39.950 --> 00:09:42.950 you're in approach, flat position, but there's no minimum 50% floor. 176 00:09:43.300 --> 00:09:45.190 It's just whatever power's required for that. 177 00:09:47.890 - > 00:09:51.750So here we are flying along. Um, this is our test conditions coming down here.

178 00:09:51.750 --> 00:09:55.670 We've worked our way all the way down through the first nine lines and we're 179 00:09:55.670 --> 00:09:59.030 happy. And then we get to that one and that's flight 1 74. 180 00:09:59.290 --> 00:10:02.070 And that's when we hit the brick wall and like, ah, this isn't good. Uh, 181 00:10:02.070 --> 00:10:03.470 we've got a problem we need to solve here. 182 00:10:03.810 --> 00:10:06.830 And it is obviously a very clear problem that needs to be solved because of the 183 00:10:06.830 --> 00:10:09.670 departure. It wasn't just someone coming back saying it's non-compliant. 184 00:10:09.820 --> 00:10:12.950 It's like, you can tell things aren't working out so well. Um, 185 00:10:15.800 --> 00:10:19.540 so for our standard, uh, risk assessment for the stalls, uh, 186 00:10:19.540 --> 00:10:21.780 we'd already built in, uh, our, this is kind of our, 187 00:10:21.930 --> 00:10:24.460 kind of our standard library of things that we'll do for these types of 188 00:10:24.740 --> 00:10:27.980 maneuvers. Uh, we do idle before power on, which makes sense, right? 189 00:10:27.980 --> 00:10:29.460 Get to learn the aircraft. Uh, 190 00:10:29.460 --> 00:10:32.180 we do wings level before the other stalls turning and accelerated.

191 00:10:32.180 --> 00:10:35.300 And these were wings level stalls. That's where we got stuck. We, of course, 192 00:10:35.520 --> 00:10:40.500 we require margin, right? We talked a lot about the unknown unknowns. Well, 193 00:10:40.500 --> 00:10:42.140 we always talk about building in margin. Well, 194 00:10:42.140 --> 00:10:44.380 we always require a certain amount of altitude for these maneuvers. 195 00:10:44.680 --> 00:10:46.900 And we were above 10,000 foot ag when this occurred. 196 00:10:47.000 --> 00:10:49.500 So the al the ground was we had to recover the aircraft, 197 00:10:49.500 --> 00:10:51.980 but at the same time we weren't gonna hit the ground when we departed flight. 198 00:10:51.980 --> 00:10:56.200 Cause we had plenty of margin there. Um, we had, uh, TM calls for knock it off, 199 00:10:56.200 --> 00:10:59.520 which was, uh, 50 50 boom aoa, which is a lot. 200 00:10:59.660 --> 00:11:01.680 But that when you have this much power on the aircraft, it's, 201 00:11:01.710 --> 00:11:05.600 it's can conduc a lot of aa. So, and then standard uh, recovery. Mm-hmm. 202 00:11:07.460 --> 00:11:09.840 Now here we are with an aircraft that's got lots of, uh, lots of,

203

00:11:09.840 --> 00:11:12.880 now we've gotta go back to this pilot of exceptional skill has to be able to do 204 00:11:12.880 --> 00:11:13.713 this. So we're not using, 205 00:11:13.850 --> 00:11:17.720 we've got this great instrumentation system with boom data AOA and side slip. 206 00:11:17.740 --> 00:11:21.610 But that's not what we can use cuz it has to be a pilot can't have to have 207 00:11:21.610 --> 00:11:23.730 exceptional skill to be able to stall the aircraft. So they need, 208 00:11:23.800 --> 00:11:26.530 what do they have in front of 'em? Well, they got the pfd. Um, 209 00:11:27.190 --> 00:11:30.210 so as you come into the test technique, you got the stall entry, 210 00:11:30.210 --> 00:11:33.370 nice and stable, looking for that two seconds from the control stop. 211 00:11:33.470 --> 00:11:37.320 And your only feedback loop is really that, that's all you got. 212 00:11:37.580 - > 00:11:39.840How much slide slip do you have is trying to keep the ball centered. 213 00:11:40.140 --> 00:11:42.200 And of course your bank angle that you're looking at, 214 00:11:42.200 --> 00:11:44.040 that's all you got to work with as the, 215 00:11:44.060 -> 00:11:45.960if you're gonna take it on a production aircraft,

216 00:11:46.380 --> 00:11:49.400 and of course this aircraft doesn't mentioned earlier the King air, 217 00:11:49.400 --> 00:11:51.800 you have to fly it out of the stall. A lot of other aircraft, 218 00:11:51.860 --> 00:11:53.760 if you just shove the yolk forward, 219 00:11:53.760 --> 00:11:57.440 it break AOA breaks the aircraft com becomes a complete gentle beast. 220 00:11:57.460 --> 00:12:00.720 The King Air, if you just do that, it'll start to roll off on you more. So, 221 00:12:01.920 --> 00:12:04.890 so there we are. How are we gonna move forward with this? Well, 222 00:12:06.030 --> 00:12:07.410 we really did focus. We knew, 223 00:12:07.410 --> 00:12:09.970 we did spend some time a little bit on the why it happened, 224 00:12:09.970 --> 00:12:12.770 but we really focused on how are we gonna move forward and, uh, 225 00:12:13.010 --> 00:12:16.970 keep the test program moving. Um, so we did a couple things. We, uh, 226 00:12:18.350 --> 00:12:20.210 we reduced the, to get the variation down, 227 00:12:20.210 --> 00:12:23.170 we actually made a very small pool of pilots that would fly the maneuvers to try 228 $00:12:23.170 \longrightarrow 00:12:25.010$ and get some consistency. Um,

229 00:12:25.350 --> 00:12:29.250 and then we started working our way back in CG and power to be able to figure 230 00:12:29.250 --> 00:12:32.570 out where's the line here, where things are gonna go wrong for us. Uh, 231 00:12:32.630 --> 00:12:34.730 we also did a couple things to our instrumentation displays. 232 00:12:34.730 --> 00:12:37.370 You can see that in the, uh, top right we, uh, 233 00:12:37.760 --> 00:12:40.090 made the NZ a little larger so it's more obvious. 234 00:12:40.090 --> 00:12:42.130 So we can catch that hopefully if we have a, have a departure. 235 00:12:42.630 --> 00:12:45.250 And then we start to explore what we thought was the biggest thing, 236 00:12:45.250 --> 00:12:46.083 which was power. 237 00:12:46.230 --> 00:12:49.430 How much is the power affecting us and doing additional buildup. Um, 238 00:12:49.580 --> 00:12:51.910 fortunately for us, with the way that the, the, 239 00:12:51.910 --> 00:12:53.310 the customer is looking for this data, 240 00:12:53.580 --> 00:12:56.790 they were happy to move up to an Amendment 62 level, 241 00:12:57.200 --> 00:13:01.030 which LA allowed us to have a lower power setting from what was required to

242 00:13:01.190 --> 00:13:05.680 complete the maneuver with the Amendment 50. And I know this is gonna get asked. 243 00:13:06.190 --> 00:13:09.520 Most of our, we are fortunate, most of our aircraft detection aviation, uh, 244 00:13:09.520 --> 00:13:13.560 quit was the recovery shoots and, uh, bailout options for our crews. 245 00:13:13.900 --> 00:13:17.120 But the King Airs is an old enough aircraft and the the original prototypes for 246 00:13:17.120 --> 00:13:21.280 those don't exist. And each King Air is essentially unique. Um, 247 00:13:21.300 --> 00:13:24.720 so we didn't have the option for recovery shoots on the aircraft, 248 00:13:24.780 --> 00:13:27.840 or at least not a simple easy solution for recovery shoots. 249 00:13:28.140 --> 00:13:30.360 So we had to ask ourselves, how do we continue doing this? 250 00:13:30.360 --> 00:13:32.720 Cuz we obviously had a nasty departure. Well, 251 00:13:32.720 --> 00:13:35.040 if we actually figured out from that departure what the, 252 00:13:35.040 --> 00:13:37.040 the slice back to the right would look like, 253 00:13:37.040 --> 00:13:41.120 maybe an incipient spin entry is actually just the aircraft saying, oh, 254 00:13:41.120 --> 00:13:44.440

that's what you want. Now I've got some cue back over the tail. It's like, 255 00:13:44.440 --> 00:13:45.760 I'll give you exactly what you're asking for. 256 00:13:45.980 --> 00:13:48.120 And that's me fighting at the roll off. 257 00:13:48.340 --> 00:13:51.280 And then the aircraft suddenly got fast again, just enough q on the tail, 258 00:13:51.280 --> 00:13:52.240 it goes, all right, here we go. 259 00:13:52.240 --> 00:13:53.960 Here's your full rudder and here's your full elron. 260 00:13:54.100 --> 00:13:55.600 And that's why it rapidly sliced back. 261 00:13:55.600 --> 00:13:59.600 So the king air actually behaves exceptionally well as soon as you get just a 262 00:13:59.600 --> 00:14:00.720 little bit of speed back over it. 263 00:14:01.060 --> 00:14:03.480 So if you couple that with a margin and careful buildup, 264 00:14:03.480 --> 00:14:07.200 we've came up with an approach that allowed us to move forward. All right, 265 00:14:07.470 --> 00:14:08.303 back to Dan. 266 00:14:10.170 --> 00:14:11.003 Sure. 267

00:14:11.330 --> 00:14:15.550 So a lot of the kind of things that we did from that point on were basically 268 00:14:15.550 --> 00:14:18.230 hunting and stabbing and trying to find something that would work. 269 00:14:18.360 --> 00:14:21.950 We're still in the black or white, this works, or this is certifiable, 270 00:14:21.950 --> 00:14:24.510 this is not certifiable. And we're trying a bunch of different things. 271 00:14:24.510 --> 00:14:27.030 We're taking pieces of the airplane off, uh, take the, 272 00:14:27.130 --> 00:14:30.990 the tail rate 'em off or take the uh, uh, eventually even took the, uh, 273 00:14:30.990 --> 00:14:32.190 the belly modification off, 274 00:14:32.190 --> 00:14:34.470 changed the four blade of props to five blade of props, 275 00:14:34.650 --> 00:14:38.790 trying to find what is it that is going on and how do we get out of the woods. 276 00:14:39.490 --> 00:14:41.830 Uh, and, and the whole process there. 277 00:14:42.210 --> 00:14:46.750 We started to get pretty dang good at doing stalls. And it was, uh, 278 00:14:46.750 --> 00:14:50.390 starting to question are, are we getting too good at this? 279 00:14:50.450 --> 00:14:54.560 Are we becoming exceptional? And fortunately the answer was no. But, uh,

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00:14:55.420 --> 00:14:58.000 we keep trying, we keep trying, uh, 281 00:14:58.000 --> 00:15:01.080 just to show you that we did our due diligence and just because I think CFD is 282 00:15:01.100 --> 00:15:03.880 so dang cool, uh, we put, uh, 283 00:15:03.900 --> 00:15:06.680 we took a look at it and what you can see here on the left is without the 284 00:15:06.680 --> 00:15:08.160 modifications to the airplane on the right. 285 00:15:08.160 --> 00:15:11.320 So that baseline I was telling you about, uh, you look at the tail, 286 00:15:11.320 --> 00:15:14.200 it looks like it's stolen. And, and critically the unboard wing is too, 287 00:15:15.250 --> 00:15:19.310 on the right side. It's not. Uh, so what you have is, uh, what you don't want. 288 00:15:19.450 --> 00:15:21.590 The Aron uh, roll control has gone away, 289 00:15:22.130 --> 00:15:24.590 but the inside of the wing is still flying, you know, 290 00:15:24.690 --> 00:15:29.070 so we got some significant pitch attitudes, uh, through this whole process and, 291 00:15:29.450 --> 00:15:32.790 and, uh, control shaping to pull back on the yoke. And that was, uh, 292 00:15:32.790 -> 00:15:35.990entertaining, especially with folks that hadn't flown this before. And, uh,

293 00:15:36.210 --> 00:15:39.230 you see some really big eyeballs in the right seat, uh, for that. 294 00:15:39.250 --> 00:15:42.670 But we did our due diligence and, uh, and revised, uh, 295 00:15:42.670 --> 00:15:43.750 our risk mitigation process. 296 00:15:44.250 --> 00:15:47.630 We pretty much just didn't want to do the bad things again. Uh, 297 00:15:47.630 --> 00:15:51.230 and then we want to figure out which configuration con and, um, 298 00:15:51.320 --> 00:15:54.790 conditions that the stall characteristics would be certifiable. 299 00:15:55.170 --> 00:15:58.310 So we really integrated TM as part of the crew there. Uh, 300 00:15:58.420 --> 00:16:01.590 some good tight parameter feedback after each run, uh, 301 00:16:01.590 --> 00:16:04.430 really learned through the process, uh, cuz we had a lot of time to practice it, 302 00:16:04.690 --> 00:16:07.910 uh, what we wanted to know and when, and when to be quiet. Uh, 303 00:16:07.910 --> 00:16:12.870 that is an old story, but, uh, but we continued to evolve that too and, uh, 304 00:16:12.870 --> 00:16:15.430 knock it off. Sometimes we were already in the knock it off. It's, 305 00:16:15.430 --> 00:16:18.790 it's hard to actually get the knock it off out that fast. Uh,

306 00:16:18.850 --> 00:16:23.190 before we were already doing it, uh, CRM and the cockpit was critical, uh, 307 00:16:23.190 --> 00:16:26.750 both the right seat and left seat to flying or whoever was flying the thing. 308 00:16:26.750 --> 00:16:30.670 The, and we briefed it before each of them, and there were some automatic, uh, 309 00:16:30.670 --> 00:16:32.350 things that could be done. Uh, 310 00:16:32.350 --> 00:16:34.590 there was a certain point in these if they were not gonna go well, 311 00:16:34.590 --> 00:16:37.510 it just feel like somebody shoved you off to the side. And it was like, 312 00:16:37.530 --> 00:16:40.550 I'm no longer really flying this thing. And at that point, uh, 313 00:16:40.650 --> 00:16:44.510 we would initiate the recovery if we had an excessive roll angle or the, 314 00:16:44.570 --> 00:16:47.630 it rolled to the point that where pitch is starting to look down, uh, 315 00:16:47.630 --> 00:16:50.110 throttle movement was automatic, uh, 316 00:16:50.260 --> 00:16:54.590 from the co-pilot's perspective or pilot not flying as was the, uh, the flaps. 317 00:16:54.590 --> 00:16:57.830 You could bring the flaps up to approach, which bought us another, uh,

00:16:57.830 --> 00:17:01.710 30 knots or so or, or up as need be. So, uh, 319 00:17:02.230 --> 00:17:06.310 additionally we automatically started a G cadence. So if you're, ah, 320 00:17:06.310 --> 00:17:09.950 trying to pull, uh, and save yourself, uh, kind of thing, 321 00:17:10.020 --> 00:17:14.110 it's really helpful to hear a 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.6. 322 00:17:14.110 --> 00:17:15.430 And that way we kept the below two, 323 00:17:15.430 --> 00:17:19.550 which was just a limitation based upon our ballast. So the airplane, uh, 324 00:17:19.750 --> 00:17:22.430 continued to evolve in configuration as we went along. As I've shown, 325 00:17:22.430 --> 00:17:26.470 here's a nice picture, uh, with the sensor hanging out. And you can see, uh, 326 00:17:26.530 --> 00:17:30.910 we were required to cleverly wrap, uh, the, uh, the external shape, 327 00:17:31.040 --> 00:17:34.390 which makes it look like a Christmas present in exactly the same shape that it 328 00:17:34.390 --> 00:17:36.950 is, but it's, uh, pretty funny. So, uh, 329 00:17:37.210 --> 00:17:40.270 we went back and forth with the four blades and five blades, uh, 330 00:17:40.330 --> 00:17:43.830 per customer requirement. And, um, and we saw what that did,

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00:17:45.080 --> 00:17:48.860 had a tremendous mixed bag of results throughout this entire evolution. 332 00:17:49.220 --> 00:17:53.200 But we ultimately discovered a dependency with, with gross weight and cg. It's, 333 00:17:53.200 --> 00:17:55.000 uh, makes a lot of sense that it would be cg. 334 00:17:55.000 --> 00:17:58.560 That's what we started tinkering with first. But we, uh, we stumbled upon like, 335 00:17:58.560 --> 00:18:00.080 Hey, you know, when we're heavy at this cq, 336 00:18:00.080 --> 00:18:03.200 it's a lot easier than when we're not. Mm-hmm. So, uh, 337 00:18:03.200 --> 00:18:06.880 we also found some dependencies of control shaping and, uh, you know, uh, 338 00:18:06.900 --> 00:18:11.360 as far as the test technique of, uh, getting that, uh, 339 00:18:11.360 --> 00:18:16.080 pitch the ass stop and, uh, also the amount of roll coordination to go along, 340 00:18:16.080 --> 00:18:19.440 which is sort of a natural thing, but how much roll coordination with, uh, 341 00:18:19.440 --> 00:18:23.240 pedal are gonna use with the Aron, uh, as you come into it, uh, 342 00:18:23.240 --> 00:18:24.480 what's depicted there is, 343 00:18:24.820 --> 00:18:28.200 is the top one is the right amount of roll coordination. The bottom one,

344 00:18:28.200 --> 00:18:30.920 there's a lag or a little to no roll coordination. 345 00:18:31.380 --> 00:18:35.880 And that brief moment is enough to, uh, to let that, uh, 346 00:18:35.940 --> 00:18:40.420 get away from you. So it really, uh, was a matter of going into it, very stable. 347 00:18:40.880 --> 00:18:44.220 And then, uh, and then getting the, uh, the job done with the roll coordination. 348 00:18:45.000 --> 00:18:48.660 Uh, so what we looked at each other here at this point went, uh, 349 00:18:48.680 --> 00:18:53.550 how do we take the fact that we've done 600 stalls or so off the table? 350 00:18:54.170 --> 00:18:55.830 And, and that was really, well, 351 00:18:56.420 --> 00:18:59.030 I've heard of this thing called the Cooper Harper Rating Scale. 352 00:18:59.420 --> 00:19:02.590 What do you think about trying that? And just see how hard these things are. 353 00:19:03.410 --> 00:19:06.310 And when we go out there in the corner of the top part of it, 354 00:19:06.310 --> 00:19:09.150 which I'll show you here in a bit, and we're heavy and it wasn't hard at all. 355 00:19:09.160 --> 00:19:12.430 We're getting twos and threes of, you know, we set ourselves a, uh,

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00:19:12.580 --> 00:19:15.710 desired performance at 10 degrees of roll and 10 degrees of side slip. 357 00:19:15.930 --> 00:19:18.190 Not that we could really control the side slip that tightly, 358 00:19:18.190 --> 00:19:22.390 but at least we got the feedback. And then 15 degrees of course for certifiable, 359 00:19:22.390 --> 00:19:25.270 we called that adequate and went into the table there and just took a, 360 00:19:25.420 --> 00:19:29.910 took a look at it and we eventually reduced the pilots down to a couple and, uh, 361 00:19:29.910 --> 00:19:33.220 started working from there. Uh, 362 00:19:33.220 --> 00:19:37.980 with that we were hunting for the line between okay and not okay. 363 00:19:38.400 --> 00:19:39.380 So, uh, 364 00:19:39.380 --> 00:19:43.500 it resolved down to the only configuration that mattered here was the gear and 365 00:19:43.500 --> 00:19:46.500 flaps down with the power on configuration. Uh, 366 00:19:46.600 --> 00:19:49.900 and then we went out and with a methodical process and started looking at gross 367 00:19:49.900 --> 00:19:54.580 weight, a lot down center of gravity lines, uh, with the power set where, uh, 368 00:19:54.640 --> 00:19:57.180

Stu was talking about, we had elected to go ahead and put that, 369 00:19:57.180 --> 00:20:01.900 I think it was 43%. So they started okay. And they ended up not okay, 370 00:20:01.960 --> 00:20:05.500 how do we tell the inflection point between them? And, uh, I tell you, 371 00:20:05.500 --> 00:20:08.620 we got seriously tired of doing stalls even on each of these. 372 00:20:08.620 --> 00:20:12.060 There's a lot of scatter in here with, uh, with those. But, uh, 373 00:20:12.060 --> 00:20:15.940 that sometimes we were taking a break. We go out in the, in the heavy, uh, 374 00:20:15.940 --> 00:20:19.220 you'll see great, uh, weight on the left, ASEs, of course. 375 00:20:19.220 --> 00:20:23.460 And across the bottom is, uh, CG as you might imagine. Uh, 376 00:20:23.480 --> 00:20:27.780 and then we started mapping what they were. Uh, and using hqr as well. 377 00:20:27.780 --> 00:20:31.300 Typically you'd start off with a, with a, uh, level one, you know, 378 00:20:31.300 --> 00:20:32.180 maybe in the threes. 379 00:20:32.400 --> 00:20:35.820 And then you'd start walking your way down into four if you believe in a four 380 00:20:35.820 --> 00:20:37.820 and a half. Uh, that seemed applicable too, 381 00:20:37.840 --> 00:20:42.140

but fives and sixes and then holy crap sevens, uh, all happened. 382 00:20:42.680 --> 00:20:46.700And there usually was a pretty clear break point in between those two. 383 00:20:46.700 --> 00:20:50.120 That inflection point happened pretty quickly. And then we'd back it off, uh, 384 00:20:50.120 --> 00:20:53.440 from there and said, I think it's about there. So, uh, 385 00:20:53.500 --> 00:20:57.480 we brought handling qualities into the mix and that allowed us to, 386 00:20:57.660 --> 00:21:00.080 to figure out the inflection point between good and bad. 387 00:21:01.890 --> 00:21:05.090 I wanted to give you a detailed picture of the final test configuration. 388 00:21:07.300 --> 00:21:12.020 Maybe someday, uh, I don't know. We did go back to four bladed props. 389 00:21:12.020 --> 00:21:16.220 The last one was five bladed. And this is where we went deliberately down, uh, 390 00:21:16.410 --> 00:21:20.660 each uh, CG line at this point. We were, uh, 391 00:21:20.660 --> 00:21:21.780 trying to be definitive. 392 00:21:22.090 --> 00:21:26.820 It's like this is the answer for the configuration that the customer has. Uh, 393 00:21:26.820 --> 00:21:30.780 what the customer does with that information is up to them and the certification

394 00:21:30.780 --> 00:21:34.180 authority that they operate under. But we needed to provide the information. 395 00:21:34.450 --> 00:21:37.780 It's okay here, it's not okay there. So that's exactly what we were doing. 396 00:21:38.160 --> 00:21:42.500 And we took out, uh, the, um, other pilot, uh, 397 00:21:42.500 --> 00:21:45.300 type information limited down to a clean set of data. 398 00:21:45.640 --> 00:21:48.660 And we got ourselves a pretty clear one. There was still like the occasional, 399 00:21:48.900 --> 00:21:51.300 I was like, oh, they didn't quite make it in there, but, uh, 400 00:21:51.520 --> 00:21:56.470 but by and large it looked pretty clean. Tell us what we learned, 401 00:21:56.490 --> 00:21:57.323 sir. 402 00:21:57.990 --> 00:22:01.740 Thank you, sir. All right. So lots of good stuff came out of this, uh, 403 00:22:01.740 --> 00:22:06.210 program for us. Um, so typically when we're out doing stalls for cert, 404 00:22:06.560 --> 00:22:09.610 it's a pass fail. It either worked or it didn't. You're not trying to, 405 00:22:09.910 --> 00:22:12.490 and then if you don't like what you have, you don't go around and say, well, 406 00:22:12.490 --> 00:22:15.090

where does it work? You fix the aircraft aerodynamically. 407 00:22:15.090 --> 00:22:18.370 But that was not an aerodynamic fix or something like similar. 408 00:22:18.470 --> 00:22:20.930 We had a similar issue with power on stalls in the Sky carrier where we put a 409 00:22:20.930 --> 00:22:24.450 pusher on it because you just got the inner part of the wings just energized 410 00:22:24.450 --> 00:22:28.250 with the way the, the, the flow goes through there. So, but here now we're like, 411 00:22:28.250 --> 00:22:29.890 no, we need to define where that line is, 412 00:22:30.350 --> 00:22:34.590 but you gotta define that line for a non exceptional pilot who were by people 413 00:22:34.590 --> 00:22:35.870 that have been doing lots of stalls. 414 00:22:35.870 --> 00:22:39.310 And that's a different challenge than what we typically do when we try to do 415 00:22:39.310 --> 00:22:43.280 stalls. So it really did allow us to, so the, 416 00:22:43.280 --> 00:22:46.800 the Cooper Harper Scale and using that allowed us to really isolate what are we 417 00:22:46.800 --> 00:22:50.000 doing with our hands and feet? What is the level of workload we're doing? 418 00:22:50.420 --> 00:22:53.880

And then backing off a little bit from that to make sure that we're not biasing 419 00:22:53.880 --> 00:22:56.160 it too much cuz we're experienced doing this maneuver. 420 00:22:56.660 - > 00:22:59.640One thing that's important is that, yeah, we had the occasional one that was, 421 00:22:59.700 --> 00:23:03.840 uh, would roll off more, but, uh, those, the, the workload increased, 422 00:23:03.860 --> 00:23:07.640 but we were still, what we, we would what's often called non-hazardous stalls. 423 00:23:08.020 --> 00:23:11.480 So you may have sometimes exceeded the bank angle as you start to, uh, 424 00:23:11.480 --> 00:23:13.080 as you start to get to the bottom of the, 425 00:23:13.100 --> 00:23:16.080 of the area where you're getting a little bit more bank angle, maybe side slips, 426 00:23:16.120 --> 00:23:17.800 building up a little more than you wanted, 427 00:23:18.060 --> 00:23:20.280 but at the same time it's never been hazardous per se. 428 00:23:20.580 --> 00:23:22.120 So then we're at least we're saying, okay, 429 00:23:22.120 --> 00:23:24.800 we ought at least be non-hazardous if we start to see these things go wrong. 430 00:23:24.800 --> 00:23:26.080 And of course we're looking for that compliance,

431 00:23:26.080 --> 00:23:28.120 we're all backing up from there to try and know, 432 00:23:28.120 --> 00:23:32.520 cause we need to have a margin for the non, for the customer pilot. Uh, 433 00:23:32.700 --> 00:23:35.680 and this, this customer will probably stall the aircraft for training. 434 00:23:36.260 --> 00:23:40.320 And so we obviously wanna make sure that it's safe for our customer and that the 435 00:23:40.320 --> 00:23:43.320 line we define is good for them cuz they're gonna take a a probably a cut out of 436 00:23:43.320 --> 00:23:44.153 the cg. 437 00:23:46.210 --> 00:23:49.220 Clearly we had a host of parameters that are affecting the stall 438 00:23:49.220 --> 00:23:52.980 characteristics, but we, it was just really handy, 439 00:23:52.980 --> 00:23:56.620 helpful that we're able to isolate down to a, uh, 440 00:23:57.060 --> 00:24:00.900 a control line that we could do where we were able to drive the CG into one 441 00:24:00.900 --> 00:24:03.540 spot. And then once we knew those weight dependency just burned down gas, 442 00:24:03.540 --> 00:24:07.420 which made it really easy to go through and see the workload and the amount of

00:24:07.420 --> 00:24:10.780 control inputs we're putting in both in elron and rudder and start to see the 444 00:24:10.780 --> 00:24:12.300 quality handling quality degrades. 445 00:24:12.300 --> 00:24:15.260 So then you can see that clearly as you just marched down in burning fuel, 446 00:24:15.430 --> 00:24:19.220 which really helped, uh, the ability to control your, uh, those parameters is, 447 00:24:19.220 --> 00:24:21.150 was such an important, uh, uh, 448 00:24:21.150 --> 00:24:25.350 parameter for us that allowed us to achieve our results. Of course, that crm, 449 00:24:25.850 --> 00:24:28.950 um, we always already talked about it this morning, but just simple things. 450 00:24:29.330 --> 00:24:32.230 We never had any more, uh, any more over speeds or over gs. Uh, 451 00:24:32.230 --> 00:24:34.550 we had a couple that where we still found some nastiness, 4.52 00:24:34.850 --> 00:24:38.900 but the automatic actions by pilot monitoring took care of getting the aircraft 453 00:24:38.900 --> 00:24:41.220 in a configuration that was not less light to have issues. 454 00:24:41.240 --> 00:24:42.780 Really when you took the power out,

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00:24:43.130 --> 00:24:46.380 usually the aircraft almost immediately recovered and it was much happier. 456 00:24:47.360 --> 00:24:51.100 And of course, uh, we added in a, uh, slide slip criteria more for a, um, 457 00:24:51.150 --> 00:24:52.220 cease test criteria. 458 00:24:52.440 --> 00:24:54.980 The slide slip is not a control parameter you really have for an, uh, 459 00:24:54.980 --> 00:24:57.940 normal pilot, but if it starts to get close to the 15, 460 00:24:57.940 --> 00:25:01.170 there's no point it's gonna be non-compliant. So why would you keep going? 461 00:25:01.170 --> 00:25:03.450 You've already proven your point. And that was really, 462 00:25:03.510 --> 00:25:06.730 we kind of understood when that started to build just from the control inputs 463 00:25:06.730 --> 00:25:07.563 you're putting in. 464 00:25:08.820 --> 00:25:11.760 And of course the last thing was our flight test displays. 465 00:25:11.780 --> 00:25:15.160 We always usually focus our display systems on collecting the data for the test 466 00:25:15.160 --> 00:25:19.080 at hand, but uh, so we had NZ on that display. Uh, 467 00:25:19.080 --> 00:25:23.440 but the NZ was not a test parameter for executing the maneuver.

468 00:25:23.540 --> 00:25:28.340 It was a recovery parameter that was critical. If things went south on you, 469 00:25:28.560 --> 00:25:30.900 you needed that to be clear and unmistakable. 470 00:25:31.160 --> 00:25:32.620 So that was kinda the last thing that was like, 471 00:25:32.620 --> 00:25:36.220 just to make sure that the information presenting to you covers the if things go 472 00:25:36.220 --> 00:25:37.460 wrong scenario though, 473 00:25:37.460 --> 00:25:40.060 you'll have the right data in front of you in a clear format so that you can 474 00:25:40.060 --> 00:25:45.010 make a, an appropriate recovery. And that is it. 475 00:25:46.670 --> 00:25:47.610 We will take questions. 476 00:25:59.900 --> 00:26:00.733 There you go. 477 00:26:02.770 --> 00:26:06.860 Very interesting. I'm just wondering though, if you didn't have that SOX moment, 478 00:26:07.240 --> 00:26:11.300 uh, on your ninth or 10th flight, uh, you wouldn't have gotten into this uh, 479 00:26:11.770 --> 00:26:15.180 extensive test program, but was there anything going back, uh,

480 00:26:15.180 --> 00:26:18.460 on the data from the first nine or 10 stalls that would've given you an 481 00:26:18.460 --> 00:26:20.140 indication that, uh, this was a problem? 482 00:26:20.320 --> 00:26:24.100 So on that particular flight, we were, and this is where this is a, 483 00:26:24.200 --> 00:26:26.300 it was an interesting discussion we had at one of our safety meetings. 484 00:26:26.300 --> 00:26:30.820 So I'd already said we we're non-compliant on about stall six of that particular 485 00:26:30.820 --> 00:26:33.660 condition. Cuz like I don't have, I, I'm starting to see, 486 00:26:33.800 --> 00:26:36.540 I'm having to control side slip using my slide slip parameter on my 487 00:26:36.540 --> 00:26:39.180 instrumentation to be able to see if I can make this work and we're done. 488 00:26:39.280 --> 00:26:41.820 Cuz no product, a normal pilot doesn't have that. 489 00:26:41.820 --> 00:26:43.320 So we had already decided we were done, were done. 490 00:26:43.320 --> 00:26:45.600 But we were trying to understand the characteristics, see if it was possible, 491 00:26:45.780 --> 00:26:48.800 and then try to move forward from there. And that's a really interesting line, 492 00:26:48.800 --> 00:26:52.850 right? Where, at what point do you try to gain,

493 00:26:52.850 --> 00:26:55.610 gain information at what time you just knock it off and go home? And you know, 494 00:26:55.610 --> 00:27:00.370 obviously we had a departure so we went a little too far on the flip side. Um, 495 00:27:00.420 --> 00:27:04.930 there was no arguing that we had something to fix. So, right, it's, there was, 496 00:27:04.930 --> 00:27:06.970 there was, um, and the aircraft wasn't damaged at all. 497 00:27:06.970 --> 00:27:10.210 It was down for about a week for inspection. The king air's a beast. Um, 498 00:27:10.710 --> 00:27:15.340 but the, it really allowed us to, it was, there was no discussion. 499 00:27:15.340 --> 00:27:17.460 It was like, okay, this is a problem the customer totally knew, 500 00:27:17.460 --> 00:27:20.900 understood and trying to solve that with, uh, a, a bunch of different, 501 00:27:20.900 --> 00:27:24.910 more other methods that wouldn't other than aerodynamic fixes. 502 00:27:24.910 --> 00:27:26.700 But no, you're right. The, uh, 503 00:27:26.700 --> 00:27:30.930 it it made it easy to sell the story that, yeah. So 504 00:27:37.510 --> 00:27:38.343 question over here. 505 00:27:45.530 --> 00:27:49.310

Um, you briefly mentioned aerodynamic fixes. I didn't quite get, uh, 506 00:27:49.490 --> 00:27:54.180 why you didn't try to go that path to fix the the 507 00:27:54.300 --> 00:27:54.900 Behavior. Honestly, 508 00:27:54.900 --> 00:27:58.340 it's at a scope for what the customer's willing to do at the time. 509 00:27:58.880 --> 00:28:01.780 Now I imagine if we hadn't found a alternate solution, 510 00:28:02.540 --> 00:28:05.030 then perhaps that would've been the way to go. Like for instance, 511 00:28:05.030 --> 00:28:07.590 sky Co is a class example. We had trouble with power installs, 512 00:28:07.920 --> 00:28:10.780 brand new program, new opportunities. 513 00:28:10.790 --> 00:28:13.580 We're already doing our dynamic fixes on the aircraft is that when that aircraft 514 00:28:13.580 --> 00:28:16.610 is initial development, we're like whoa, just basically it's uh, 515 00:28:16.610 --> 00:28:19.090 we already know how to do a, Aaron can talk about this forever. 516 00:28:19.150 --> 00:28:22.580 We already know how to do pushers from the longitude and basically we copied the 517 00:28:22.580 --> 00:28:25.500 code over and put the pusher and that was the simplest path forward. Mmhmm. Um,

00:28:26.220 --> 00:28:29.560 not so simple on an aircraft like this that's been around forever. Um, 519 00:28:29.890 --> 00:28:32.640 we're not, that's certainly not an option. And then aerodynamic fixes get, 520 00:28:33.580 --> 00:28:36.610 comes into a massive science experiment and that becomes a problem. 521 00:28:36.830 --> 00:28:40.770 So we did look at a few changes to shapes on the, 522 00:28:40.770 --> 00:28:41.890 the shapes that they're providing. 523 00:28:41.890 --> 00:28:44.460 Cause obviously the baseline aircraft's compliant. Um, 524 00:28:45.350 --> 00:28:47.810 but that had a whole bunch of negative things for them too, 525 00:28:47.810 --> 00:28:50.490 cuz they couldn't necessarily meet their mission requirements. So 526 00:28:52.460 --> 00:28:54.870 Question right here, uh, 527 00:28:55.170 --> 00:28:58.320 so could you go a little slower on, 528 00:28:59.100 --> 00:29:03.160 so if you said this is non-compliant, we know that, so I, 529 00:29:03.280 --> 00:29:07.910 I missed the part that you went on and 530 00:29:08.120 --> 00:29:08.953 tried to 531 00:29:09.370 --> 00:29:10.590

Trying to understand, trying 532 00:29:10.590 --> 00:29:14.230 To find something and uh, it's kind of pushing the limit, isn't it? Or beyond? 533 00:29:15.080 --> 00:29:18.300 You can certainly say that. Absolutely. At that point it was, we were new, 534 00:29:18.300 --> 00:29:19.260 we were close to a, 535 00:29:20.230 --> 00:29:23.920 it's kind of from that part 25 world where it's possible too and you, you know, 536 00:29:23.920 --> 00:29:25.800 it's a way you can, can you do that or can you not? 537 00:29:25.940 --> 00:29:30.440 And we wanted to understand what was driving it at that point cuz everything 538 00:29:30.440 --> 00:29:33.070 else had been successful at that time. Um, 539 00:29:33.690 --> 00:29:38.230 and at that point we had seen it had a roll off that was controllable, 540 00:29:38.570 --> 00:29:41.710 but it was just exceeding an angle of bank and it had been recovering nicely 541 00:29:41.710 --> 00:29:42.543 every time. 542 00:29:42.990 --> 00:29:47.130 So the the ninth run caught us in in that we had never seen it do anything like 543 00:29:47.130 --> 00:29:47.790

it did that before. 544 00:29:47.790 --> 00:29:51.170 It just rolled off before and we were unable to keep it compliant on the bank 545 00:29:51.170 --> 00:29:55.290 angle, but not to that aggressive amount. So that's why we were thinking, okay, 546 00:29:55.330 --> 00:29:58.050 I think we've almost figured out a technique. I know we can't call us compliant, 547 00:29:58.050 --> 00:30:00.770 but at least we have something to come back and talk about. Like this is where, 548 00:30:01.350 --> 00:30:04.520 this is what we had to do and this is obviously this is why it's noncompliant, 549 00:30:04.520 --> 00:30:08.610 so we need to find a way to fix this or in terms of the role. 550 00:30:08.610 --> 00:30:10.730 But it just so happened that on that last maneuver, 551 00:30:10.790 --> 00:30:12.050 it did something we hadn't expected, 552 00:30:12.050 --> 00:30:14.650 which is it sliced back the other direction. Um, 553 00:30:14.790 --> 00:30:16.330 and that's what really caught us off guard, 554 00:30:16.330 --> 00:30:19.530 but we hadn't seen that characteristic before because I mentioned earlier that 555 00:30:19.530 --> 00:30:19.890

King Air, 556 00:30:19.890 --> 00:30:23.050 usually once it gets soon as it rolls off and starts to gain just a little bit 557 00:30:23.050 --> 00:30:25.780 of speed, responds very nicely to the control inputs. 558 00:30:25.780 --> 00:30:28.220 It just so happened on this one, we were, uh, 559 00:30:28.280 --> 00:30:30.860 had a lot of control input fighting that role that we were unexpected. 560 00:30:31.240 --> 00:30:34.740 So I I you could argue with it about did we go too far? We, 561 00:30:34.810 --> 00:30:36.100 it's great discussion. I don't know. It is, 562 00:30:36.200 --> 00:30:38.500 we had that exact discussion and safety meeting was like, 563 00:30:38.500 --> 00:30:41.460 could we have knocked it off two stalls earlier? Absolutely. 564 00:30:42.120 --> 00:30:43.580 And would that be the right decision? 565 00:30:43.980 --> 00:30:47.460 Probably because we wouldn't have had the event. Um, but at the same time, 566 00:30:47.480 --> 00:30:50.820 in real time it felt like we were close to having a solution at least that we 567 00:30:50.820 --> 00:30:51.740 understood how to make it work. 568

00:30:52.180 --> 00:30:56.500 I could add to that too, the military training will have a, a pretty wide, uh, 569 00:30:56.530 --> 00:30:59.060 band of compliance much more so than the civil ones. 570 00:30:59.060 --> 00:31:02.300 A lot tighter and non-compliant. Might've been 16 degrees a roll, 571 00:31:02.840 --> 00:31:05.380 but controlled. I just couldn't, couldn't get it there. 572 00:31:05.600 --> 00:31:08.940 So dynamically non-compliant would be a different thing and, 573 00:31:08.960 --> 00:31:10.180 and your point would be well taken, 574 00:31:10.200 --> 00:31:13.180 but we were working in the area between our experience, uh, 575 00:31:13.180 --> 00:31:16.840 going through military testing and then trying to make this, uh, 576 00:31:16.860 --> 00:31:18.560 fit within the civil certification window. 577 00:31:19.140 --> 00:31:23.510 So, so you're exactly right in the, what I call the lumps and bumps world, 578 00:31:24.130 --> 00:31:28.310 uh, you take an airplane that has really good characteristics and you have a, 579 00:31:28.330 --> 00:31:30.550 an idea from somebody's CFD that it, uh, 580 00:31:30.550 -> 00:31:34.990should do these things and should be okay. And you're right,

581 00:31:35.610 --> 00:31:39.510 you don't have the, all of the tools available sometimes in that, 582 00:31:39.510 --> 00:31:43.790 in that analysis in a mod program to go ahead and 583 00:31:44.450 --> 00:31:46.590 do a, a deep dive into the data. 584 00:31:46.590 --> 00:31:50.580 And the only way to get the data is to go do the data. And uh, uh, 585 00:31:51.250 --> 00:31:52.083 it's that, 586 00:31:52.330 --> 00:31:56.380 that little bit of our job that says sometimes you have to walk up to the edge 587 00:31:56.380 --> 00:31:59.980 of the cliff and see where it really is. And so yeah. It's, 588 00:32:00.290 --> 00:32:03.540 it's unfortunately the world we live in, in lumps and bumps. 589 00:32:04.000 --> 00:32:06.610 Yeah. And that's why it was, uh, at the time it was like, oh, there's a, 590 00:32:06.610 --> 00:32:09.090 there's a downhill portion. Didn't realize it was a cliff. Right. 591 00:32:09.110 --> 00:32:12.250 And one of those things. And that's where we found out after the fact. 592 00:32:12.310 --> 00:32:16.080 So I stay, if you wanna stay on time, I have to cut you. Cut you off. 593 00:32:16.080 --> 00:32:17.760 Gotta kick us off. Save, save the other questions.