WEBVTT

1
00:00:00.400 --> 00:00:03.300
Mentioned attending conferences and how do you measure it? Well, that's
easy.

2
00:00:03.300 --> 00:00:06.100
I can take a look at the attendance sheet and I

3
00:00:06.100 --> 00:00:09.200
can tell you what companies are safety minded or at

4
00:00:09.200 --> 00:00:12.300
least in my view that are here that are sponsoring that are

5
00:00:12.300 --> 00:00:15.300
participating. That's how I would measure

6
00:00:15.300 --> 00:00:15.500
it.

7
00:00:16.300 --> 00:00:19.200
I was tempted to actually put that box score together and show it to you.

8
00:00:19.200 --> 00:00:22.200
But then I said now be nice but you know,

9
00:00:22.200 --> 00:00:25.500
these are kind of things that piqued my interest when I go to a safety
conference and

10
00:00:25.500 --> 00:00:28.100
I take a look and see who sponsoring the event who's in the

11
00:00:28.100 --> 00:00:29.600
audience who's engaging?

12
00:00:31.100 --> 00:00:34.600
Next are some example safety policy

13
00:00:34.600 --> 00:00:37.900

statements. I will say that these are

14
00:00:37.900 --> 00:00:40.200
conforming safety policy statements. In other

15
00:00:40.200 --> 00:00:43.100
words. They've passed muster with the fa take it or leave

16
00:00:43.100 --> 00:00:46.700
it. It's your safety system. I'm just providing these as examples

17
00:00:46.700 --> 00:00:49.600
and then there's there's a

18
00:00:49.600 --> 00:00:52.600
couple of those and then there's actually a flight test specific one.

19
00:00:54.200 --> 00:00:57.000
I won't say who it's from, but you have it as an example

20
00:00:57.300 --> 00:01:00.400
take it or leave. It. Next is the actual spreadsheet that

21
00:01:00.400 --> 00:01:03.600
the FAA uses for voluntary letter of acceptance for voluntary

22
00:01:03.600 --> 00:01:03.800
program.

23
00:01:04.500 --> 00:01:07.400
So this is it right here. Remember earlier in the program today? We

24
00:01:07.400 --> 00:01:10.200
talked about what to look for. There's some good gouge there.

25
00:01:10.200 --> 00:01:12.800
If you pay attention to that, that's the questions they're going to ask
you about.

26
00:01:14.900 --> 00:01:18.800
So you have the entirety of that spreadsheet and

27
00:01:18.800 --> 00:01:21.500
so the way we've been doing this is we conducted a

28
00:01:21.500 --> 00:01:24.000
gap analysis before we did the application to the

29
00:01:24.600 --> 00:01:27.500
fa they look at it from a national level. And then

30
00:01:27.500 --> 00:01:30.500
we go through this section by section based on

31
00:01:30.500 --> 00:01:33.600
our inputs in the artifacts that we presented and then we

32
00:01:33.600 --> 00:01:37.200
move right through but by the way Tom this this voluntary

33
00:01:36.200 --> 00:01:40.500
protocol spreadsheet, I'm

34
00:01:39.500 --> 00:01:42.200
going to ask that we put it in our in our

35
00:01:42.200 --> 00:01:45.600
website electronically. Yes, not

36
00:01:45.600 --> 00:01:45.900
a problem.

37
00:01:46.800 --> 00:01:49.700
Okay, and then moving on just a

38
00:01:49.700 --> 00:01:53.600
couple other things here's the the voluntary SMS flow

39
00:01:53.600 --> 00:01:56.100
for those that are interested. This is how you work your way through

40

00:01:56.100 --> 00:01:59.400
this to get a letter of acceptance. It's really designed

41
00:01:59.400 --> 00:02:03.100
as I mentioned earlier three main pillars designed cert

42
00:02:02.100 --> 00:02:05.200
production and continued airworthiness with the

43
00:02:05.200 --> 00:02:08.900
respective regulation just for your your reference then

44
00:02:08.900 --> 00:02:11.400
we had some some information here from Chris Al

45
00:02:11.400 --> 00:02:14.300
he does a nice job with SMS Pro. It's out there

46
00:02:14.300 --> 00:02:17.800
you can subscribe to his stuff through Linkedin and other sources and

47
00:02:17.800 --> 00:02:20.300
you can get this right to your email inbox if you

48
00:02:20.300 --> 00:02:23.900
want. So if you have some trouble developing some objectives reach

49
00:02:23.900 --> 00:02:26.400
out to him and he'll give you a hand. So there's plenty of resources

50
00:02:26.400 --> 00:02:30.600
available. And then finally we included

51
00:02:29.600 --> 00:02:32.400
an article that was recently written

52
00:02:32.400 --> 00:02:35.400
by Robert sawmal former ntsp chairman now

53
00:02:35.400 --> 00:02:38.500
down at Emory Riddle University, but this is an excellent article

54
00:02:38.500 --> 00:02:41.300
for your reading pleasure on your trip home or

55
00:02:41.300 --> 00:02:42.400
whenever you feel compelled.

56
00:02:43.500 --> 00:02:46.600
Now we're moving into our safety

57
00:02:46.600 --> 00:02:49.600
or our panel session here to close

58
00:02:49.600 --> 00:02:52.100
this out. So this is your opportunity to grill the

59
00:02:52.100 --> 00:02:55.400
experts on any lingering questions that

60
00:02:55.400 --> 00:02:55.700
you have.

61
00:02:56.600 --> 00:02:59.600
They've looked at a lot of different organizations so you

62
00:02:59.600 --> 00:03:02.000
can be very specific about your line of questioning. They'll tell you

63
00:03:02.200 --> 00:03:05.300
if they can't answer it or not. But let's go back just

64
00:03:05.300 --> 00:03:08.800
to kind of let our appetite if we will on our

65
00:03:08.800 --> 00:03:11.300
original scenario and how we might handle this.

66
00:03:13.700 --> 00:03:14.800
from a leadership perspective

67

00:03:17.900 --> 00:03:19.300
Yes, sir. Just shout it out.

68
00:03:27.700 --> 00:03:32.700
I'll bend the

69
00:03:32.700 --> 00:03:33.000
airplane.

70
00:03:33.800 --> 00:03:37.100
Yeah, let's

71
00:03:36.100 --> 00:03:39.500
say for scenarios sake that it busted a

72
00:03:39.500 --> 00:03:42.900
test limit didn't hurt the airplane, but it it exceeded

73
00:03:42.900 --> 00:03:43.800
a test limit.

74
00:03:59.400 --> 00:04:02.900
No report

75
00:04:02.900 --> 00:04:06.200
filed because the the Pilot Talk

76
00:04:05.200 --> 00:04:08.200
down everybody in the cabin not to

77
00:04:08.200 --> 00:04:08.700
file report.

78
00:04:11.300 --> 00:04:17.200
Non-tm flight.

79
00:04:18.800 --> 00:04:20.300
Just a handling qualities flight.

80
00:04:21.200 --> 00:04:24.400
You know low risk just a low-risk handling qualities flight

81
00:04:24.400 --> 00:04:25.300
out there it.

82
00:04:27.800 --> 00:04:30.700
Yeah, so what if what if now that the safety manager

83
00:04:30.700 --> 00:04:33.200
so let's start with the safety manager. What is the safety manager do

84
00:04:33.200 --> 00:04:34.700
now that he's armed with this information?

85
00:04:37.800 --> 00:04:38.200
around

86
00:04:41.900 --> 00:04:44.400
I think the first question I have is the

87
00:04:44.400 --> 00:04:47.000
safety manager. Sorry right here is

88
00:04:48.500 --> 00:04:51.600
if you're if you're not reporting this port to

89
00:04:51.600 --> 00:04:52.100
G.

90
00:04:53.400 --> 00:04:56.300
Limit exceedance. What else did you hide on

91
00:04:56.300 --> 00:05:00.000
that flight or what else are you hiding? And then this second

92
00:04:59.300 --> 00:05:02.300
the first thing I'm going to do after that conversation is that

93
00:05:02.300 --> 00:05:04.100
question is going to is I'm bringing in.

94

```
00:05:05.200 --> 00:05:08.700
Probably the the test pilot and the test conductor and start

95
00:05:08.700 --> 00:05:10.400
to ask some really hard questions.

96
00:05:11.600 --> 00:05:14.200
Yes, this is maybe kind of the gray area that we were talking

97
00:05:14.200 --> 00:05:16.500
about before. Is this an error or violation?

98
00:05:20.400 --> 00:05:20.500
Hey.

99
00:05:21.600 --> 00:05:22.400
over Jean

100
00:05:23.100 --> 00:05:26.400
lap is not you know that egregious and event. It happens, right

101
00:05:26.400 --> 00:05:29.100
AirSpeed exceedances G exceedances. We prepare for those

102
00:05:29.100 --> 00:05:32.100
things. Right and that's why we said a test limit that if you bust it,

103
00:05:32.100 --> 00:05:35.700
then you rtb unless you have maybe TM that

104
00:05:35.700 --> 00:05:38.700
can clear you. So you have your flight Science Guy go no problem.

105
00:05:38.700 --> 00:05:40.900
I looked at all the parameters you're clear to continue.

106
00:05:42.100 --> 00:05:45.600
Okay, that wasn't necessarily the scenario that I'm providing here.

107
00:05:45.600 --> 00:05:47.400
But what about not reporting?
```

108
00:05:49.300 --> 00:05:52.400
That cross is the line of trust. Right? And that would that would

109
00:05:52.400 --> 00:05:53.300
really irritate me.

110
00:05:54.100 --> 00:05:57.700
And I think I'm in your campus. Well that there be some explaining to

111
00:05:57.700 --> 00:05:57.900
do.

112
00:05:58.400 --> 00:06:01.200
Because you have to nip this stuff in the bud, right? I mean

113
00:06:01.200 --> 00:06:04.300
if you're having these things go on then what else don't you know about

114
00:06:05.100 --> 00:06:08.500
and if you've got an irritant on the flight deck

115
00:06:08.500 --> 00:06:11.600
like this that may be strong handing

116
00:06:11.600 --> 00:06:15.400
the rest of the crew stifling reporting then

117
00:06:14.400 --> 00:06:17.200
that's not the culture that you

118
00:06:17.200 --> 00:06:21.200
want your organization. You need to do something about it. Anybody been

119
00:06:20.200 --> 00:06:23.900
in that position before where they had to, you know,

120
00:06:23.900 --> 00:06:25.300
dish out a little bit of tough love.

121

00:06:26.200 --> 00:06:27.400
to accrue or

122
00:06:28.400 --> 00:06:31.100
yeah, I mean it happens. Yes, sir. I just

123
00:06:31.100 --> 00:06:34.300
open up another thought, you know, it's a test crew

124
00:06:34.300 --> 00:06:36.400
records and exceedance.

125
00:06:37.100 --> 00:06:40.200
It needs to be recorded because there's all this potential

126
00:06:40.200 --> 00:06:44.100
that there was an underlying characteristic in the aircraft that somebody

127
00:06:43.100 --> 00:06:46.500
else may have noted by the same little thing and it

128
00:06:46.500 --> 00:06:49.500
never gets pointed out until there's an incident. Yeah, so you

129
00:06:49.500 --> 00:06:52.100
just overlooking some exceeds. Maybe it was

130
00:06:52.100 --> 00:06:53.500
a handling qualities issue in itself.

131
00:06:54.200 --> 00:06:57.100
Or a flight control issue or something. Yeah, or maybe

132
00:06:57.100 --> 00:07:00.100
there's never one to Omit an exceedance and what if

133
00:07:00.100 --> 00:07:01.200
there's some underlying damage?

134
00:07:01.800 --> 00:07:04.100
They didn't they didn't do a maintenance gripe on it. So

135
00:07:04.100 --> 00:07:07.200
they never did an over Gene inspection on the airplane and then that
thing broke later on.

136
00:07:07.700 --> 00:07:07.900
Yeah.

137
00:07:08.600 --> 00:07:09.500
All right, so I didn't want to.

138
00:07:10.400 --> 00:07:12.900
and I seen in

139
00:07:13.800 --> 00:07:16.200
the policy level is that any of

140
00:07:16.200 --> 00:07:19.500
any event that's discovered by other means then it

141
00:07:19.500 --> 00:07:20.200
being reported.

142
00:07:21.300 --> 00:07:24.200
It's up for discipline. So, you know,

143
00:07:24.200 --> 00:07:27.300
you do get a little bit of get out of jail free by reporting it

144
00:07:27.300 --> 00:07:30.300
but if you don't report it, well, that's that goes

145
00:07:30.300 --> 00:07:30.600
into that.

146
00:07:31.500 --> 00:07:34.300
Getting disciplined for cause because now

147
00:07:34.300 --> 00:07:36.200
you're hiding lying.

148
00:07:36.900 --> 00:07:37.700
dishonest

149
00:07:47.200 --> 00:07:48.200
That too. Yeah.

150
00:07:49.500 --> 00:07:52.500
There you go. That's that supervisory and organizational level

151
00:07:52.500 --> 00:07:55.600
in the taxonomy for HVAC fans out there and it's

152
00:07:55.600 --> 00:07:58.500
promoting people to take other risks or

153
00:07:59.700 --> 00:08:02.600
Not report other things so after this

154
00:08:02.600 --> 00:08:05.400
happens, what's the next thing that's going to not be reported?

155
00:08:06.700 --> 00:08:09.100
So it influences the younger people if you

156
00:08:09.100 --> 00:08:12.700
will on the flight. Yeah and the ntsp uncovers this

157
00:08:12.700 --> 00:08:15.800
a lot. Right? So people in the organization knew

158
00:08:15.800 --> 00:08:18.500
stuff was going on non-compliance with

159
00:08:18.500 --> 00:08:21.500
checklists taking additional risks flying the

160
00:08:21.500 --> 00:08:24.600
airplane outside the envelope unstable

161
00:08:24.600 --> 00:08:27.200

approaches land long fast, whatever. It might

162
00:08:27.200 --> 00:08:30.200
be we serve we live to fight another

163
00:08:30.200 --> 00:08:33.400
day. And guess what? We're normalizing the Deviant behavior until

164
00:08:33.400 --> 00:08:34.600
we can't

165
00:08:35.400 --> 00:08:37.900
So yeah, good stuff any other questions or comments?

166
00:08:39.900 --> 00:08:42.300
I don't know if I would handle it. It is

167
00:08:42.300 --> 00:08:45.200
a safety issue but it goes beyond that and I don't

168
00:08:45.200 --> 00:08:47.000
think I would handle it through safety channels.

169
00:08:47.600 --> 00:08:50.400
Me as a safety guy. If I heard about it. I think I'd be

170
00:08:50.400 --> 00:08:53.500
sitting down with the OG the operations group and saying

171
00:08:53.500 --> 00:08:56.100
hey this happened, you know, and this

172
00:08:56.100 --> 00:08:59.500
is a discipline issue and this is detrimental to effective testing.

173
00:08:59.500 --> 00:09:01.900
So maybe you should address this.

174
00:09:03.400 --> 00:09:06.500
Yeah, and for those that are familiar with foca programs, this

175
00:09:06.500 --> 00:09:09.900
is one of the kind of the delicate areas. It's

176
00:09:09.900 --> 00:09:12.300
supposed to be non-attributional. You're supposed to have a

177
00:09:12.300 --> 00:09:15.500
trusted agent gatekeeper in your organization that gets

178
00:09:15.500 --> 00:09:18.100
that data from your service provider. And then if there's

179
00:09:18.100 --> 00:09:21.400
an issue maybe turn that over to a training and standards guide

180
00:09:21.400 --> 00:09:24.500
to address that way you maintain the sanctity of

181
00:09:24.500 --> 00:09:25.800
the program and don't undermine it.

182
00:09:27.400 --> 00:09:30.600
I guess one thing that came to mind was a lot

183
00:09:30.600 --> 00:09:33.700
of the responses on how you'd handle. It came back coming in

184
00:09:33.700 --> 00:09:36.000
pretty hot talking about discipline immediately.

185
00:09:37.100 --> 00:09:40.300
There's always the question that yes, you've got, you know

186
00:09:40.300 --> 00:09:43.400
respect for the lead pilot. Whoever made

187
00:09:43.400 --> 00:09:46.500
the call on the flight not to report it. But there's also

188
00:09:46.500 --> 00:09:49.300

the possibility that that lead polish was

189
00:09:49.300 --> 00:09:52.400
honest in a misunderstanding of the limits and then

190
00:09:52.400 --> 00:09:55.500
the others went along with them. So it could be a conversation

191
00:09:55.500 --> 00:09:58.400
about it is the right way to approach it as opposed to coming in

192
00:09:58.400 --> 00:10:01.300
heart and then setting the view that hey if

193
00:10:01.300 --> 00:10:04.500
you may have a misunderstanding then the organization is

194
00:10:04.500 --> 00:10:05.200
going to come down on you.

195
00:10:06.600 --> 00:10:09.300
Yep, you're exactly right. This little episode could make

196
00:10:09.300 --> 00:10:12.500
or break an SMS because if the safety

197
00:10:12.500 --> 00:10:13.800
manager goes in heavy.

198
00:10:14.800 --> 00:10:17.500
You know model to Mono

199
00:10:17.500 --> 00:10:20.000
should go to that individuals. They did I overhear you correctly.

200
00:10:20.900 --> 00:10:23.900
I thought I heard this. Is that true. Yeah, you didn't

201
00:10:23.900 --> 00:10:27.100
fill it out. You didn't report it. No, why

202
00:10:26.100 --> 00:10:29.100
not? Don't you don't you think it's reportable?

203
00:10:29.900 --> 00:10:31.900
Tell you what, I'm giving you a chance to report it.

204
00:10:32.900 --> 00:10:35.300
And you know and we'll deal with it on

205
00:10:35.300 --> 00:10:38.100
the other side because if you come in heavy.

206
00:10:38.800 --> 00:10:39.200
then

207
00:10:40.100 --> 00:10:41.200
that sends another message.

208
00:10:53.200 --> 00:10:58.500
Why it

209
00:10:58.500 --> 00:11:02.100
wasn't reported directly or if there's something within the organization that's

210
00:11:01.100 --> 00:11:04.200
preventing it from being reported. You know,

211
00:11:04.200 --> 00:11:07.100
you're opening that door to make sure you take a look. Yeah, but when

212
00:11:07.100 --> 00:11:10.200
the story gets around that the safety guy was in the water cooler room.

213
00:11:11.200 --> 00:11:11.900
they're going to just

214
00:11:13.300 --> 00:11:16.400
go like roaches and just disappear where wherever this person's walking around.

215
00:11:16.400 --> 00:11:18.500
You just lose all kinds of street cred. That's

216
00:11:19.900 --> 00:11:20.500
true, but

217
00:11:21.300 --> 00:11:24.400
if if the only time the safety person is coming around is when

218
00:11:24.400 --> 00:11:27.700
there's that kind of problem to talk about that's part of the problem. I
mean

219
00:11:27.700 --> 00:11:28.300
it it

220
00:11:29.500 --> 00:11:32.500
just because the safety person shows up. It shouldn't necessarily scare
everybody.

221
00:11:33.700 --> 00:11:35.400
True but in relation to this.

222
00:11:36.500 --> 00:11:37.200
hypothetical

223
00:11:38.500 --> 00:11:41.300
Yeah, and in a more basic term it comes down to trust right

224
00:11:41.300 --> 00:11:44.200
and communication. So every anything like this

225
00:11:44.200 --> 00:11:47.300
can hurt or make your safety culture just

226
00:11:47.300 --> 00:11:51.000
a little tweak out. It turns out either increase

227
00:11:50.200 --> 00:11:54.500
it because everybody knows you're open and trustworthy. Otherwise,

228
00:11:54.500 --> 00:11:56.300
you're trying to hide things and you're not.

229
00:11:58.600 --> 00:12:01.200
Yeah to build on what a lot

230
00:12:01.200 --> 00:12:04.700
of folks have been saying a good approach that we've

231
00:12:04.700 --> 00:12:07.300
definitely seen on the Boeing side of the house is

232
00:12:07.300 --> 00:12:10.500
it is all of us against the problem. And so

233
00:12:10.500 --> 00:12:13.300
we had the problem upon the screen and it's not coming in.

234
00:12:13.300 --> 00:12:17.000
I like the language you use coming in hot right? We

235
00:12:16.100 --> 00:12:19.100
don't want to come in hot and be like, oh you messed up

236
00:12:19.100 --> 00:12:22.300
but now a conversation and a dialogue that gets

237
00:12:22.300 --> 00:12:25.500
opened up. How can all of us work to solve that problem whether it's

238
00:12:25.500 --> 00:12:28.900
the culture I think someone on that side, they

239
00:12:28.900 --> 00:12:31.800
didn't feel safe. Maybe speaking up. Maybe someone missed

240
00:12:31.800 --> 00:12:32.500
something but

241
00:12:33.700 --> 00:12:36.500

Just reiterating people The Tweak in language can be

242
00:12:36.500 --> 00:12:38.000
very helpful. And that's a very good phrase.

243
00:12:40.900 --> 00:12:43.400
So we've talked a lot about safety and

244
00:12:43.400 --> 00:12:46.400
the safety culture side of this but I think there's also a training piece

245
00:12:46.400 --> 00:12:49.400
the factors into this because the fact that that

246
00:12:49.400 --> 00:12:53.300
over exceedings was recognized means that somebody somewhere

247
00:12:52.300 --> 00:12:55.400
in the event whether it was the pilot somebody else

248
00:12:55.400 --> 00:12:58.800
in the aircraft somebody on the ground somebody involved

249
00:12:58.800 --> 00:13:01.900
with that event recognized that there was an overseedance and

250
00:13:01.900 --> 00:13:04.700
they didn't speak up and that in my mind ties into

251
00:13:04.700 --> 00:13:07.200
you know, certainly in the aircrew side of it crew Resource

252
00:13:07.200 --> 00:13:11.100
Management, right? We talk a lot about assertiveness decision-making, you

253
00:13:10.100 --> 00:13:13.400
know, in this case there was a decision made

254
00:13:13.400 --> 00:13:16.100
by somebody to not be assertive and speak up and say

255
00:13:16.100 --> 00:13:19.600
hey, I think we just had an over G. Let's take a train and

256
00:13:19.600 --> 00:13:22.300
time out whatever it might be and take a look at this and you know

257
00:13:22.300 --> 00:13:25.200
being assertive isn't an easy thing for folks to

258
00:13:25.200 --> 00:13:28.100
do, you know, even somebody who's been flying for 30 years, you know,

259
00:13:28.100 --> 00:13:31.100
you're flying next to your buddy who's been flying for the same amount of time.

260
00:13:31.100 --> 00:13:34.100
You don't want to look like an idiot in front of him. So it's not always easy for

261
00:13:34.100 --> 00:13:37.100
somebody to speak up and say hey, I think we need to take a quick

262
00:13:37.100 --> 00:13:40.000
second and dig into this. Let's just make sure we're all right, so

263
00:13:40.900 --> 00:13:43.700
I think dive into the safety culture and and the

264
00:13:43.700 --> 00:13:46.800
non-attribution perception that's

265
00:13:46.800 --> 00:13:49.200
around is an important thing. But I think also the

266
00:13:49.200 --> 00:13:52.300
training part of it making sure that folks understand that you know,

267
00:13:52.300 --> 00:13:55.400
it's okay to be assertive and that you need to speak up

268
00:13:55.400 --> 00:13:58.100
you have an obligation to speak up if there's something like

269
00:13:58.100 --> 00:14:01.200
this that goes on. I think that's also an area that needs to be looked at as

270
00:14:01.200 --> 00:14:01.200
well.

271
00:14:02.700 --> 00:14:05.100
I don't know what the scenario is exactly is. It was at

272
00:14:05.100 --> 00:14:08.000
the engineer that was overheard or I mean,

273
00:14:08.300 --> 00:14:09.900
maybe they thought the pilot was going to report it.

274
00:14:11.500 --> 00:14:14.200
You know, actually everyone that was involved should be

275
00:14:14.200 --> 00:14:17.500
submitting their own report because they're seeing it from their perspective. I

276
00:14:17.500 --> 00:14:20.400
mean, you probably played that game in college it

277
00:14:20.400 --> 00:14:23.400
in com class, right? You know, you know, everybody

278
00:14:23.400 --> 00:14:25.800
sees everything the same event a little differently.

279
00:14:27.900 --> 00:14:30.400
Well, I'm I'm giving my I'm patting

280
00:14:30.400 --> 00:14:33.300
myself on the back for a very controversial scenario, I

281
00:14:33.300 --> 00:14:36.300
guess here but these are some leadership

282
00:14:36.300 --> 00:14:39.300
challenges that you have to negotiate but I think part of

283
00:14:39.300 --> 00:14:42.500
the scenario that I intended to have on. This is that we have a robust reporting

284
00:14:42.500 --> 00:14:46.100
culture that the expectations of the accountable executive accountable

285
00:14:45.100 --> 00:14:48.300
manager call he or she

286
00:14:48.300 --> 00:14:51.200
whatever you will that we

287
00:14:51.200 --> 00:14:54.600
are going to have a reporting culture. My expectation is is that you

288
00:14:54.600 --> 00:14:57.900
know, if you have any issues at all out in airspace executing

289
00:14:57.900 --> 00:15:00.500
a test point or otherwise that you report

290
00:15:00.500 --> 00:15:00.600
it.

291
00:15:01.200 --> 00:15:04.400
And if you're not then there's there's going

292
00:15:04.400 --> 00:15:07.200
to be some debriefing going on and you

293
00:15:07.200 --> 00:15:10.600
know, I think we can all agree that a Frank debrief is is

294

00:15:10.600 --> 00:15:13.400
crucial and you really should focus on

295
00:15:13.400 --> 00:15:16.500
on a good healthy debrief and people shouldn't get their feelings hurt

296
00:15:16.500 --> 00:15:19.800
in a constructive debrief, but that's

297
00:15:19.800 --> 00:15:22.100
can be sometimes hard to do if your culture is

298
00:15:22.100 --> 00:15:22.700
not set correctly.

299
00:15:23.200 --> 00:15:26.800
Rod you had mentioned want to get into some specific so

300
00:15:26.800 --> 00:15:29.300
I want to come back and let's not run out

301
00:15:29.300 --> 00:15:32.900
of time and talking about some maybe narrowing

302
00:15:32.900 --> 00:15:34.300
in on objectives.

303
00:15:35.100 --> 00:15:38.100
That you have any specific thoughts on being specifically I just

304
00:15:38.100 --> 00:15:42.000
want to hear because I didn't hear I didn't hear the kinds

305
00:15:41.100 --> 00:15:44.200
of specifics that I mentioned or as a

306
00:15:44.200 --> 00:15:47.100
reduced acts reduce Miss house by 10% over the next

307
00:15:47.100 --> 00:15:50.100
six months or something like that. There's something you

308
00:15:50.100 --> 00:15:53.100
can measure and you can you have a KSI and

309
00:15:53.100 --> 00:15:56.300
PSI that you can metric that you

310
00:15:56.300 --> 00:15:56.700
can measure.

311
00:15:57.600 --> 00:16:00.900
So so I like to hear your thoughts

312
00:16:00.900 --> 00:16:03.400
on that. Is it because I didn't hear that kind

313
00:16:03.400 --> 00:16:06.100
of it's specific example in any of

314
00:16:06.100 --> 00:16:09.800
the maybe a couple of them got got close but

315
00:16:09.800 --> 00:16:11.000
not quite so

316
00:16:11.900 --> 00:16:14.500
Yeah one thought on this is so currently

317
00:16:14.500 --> 00:16:17.300
the flight safety foundation and some of you might be part

318
00:16:17.300 --> 00:16:20.200
of this group. It's called learning from all operations. Have anybody heard

319
00:16:20.200 --> 00:16:21.600
from that learning from all operations?

320
00:16:22.500 --> 00:16:25.400
Okay. So flight safety Foundation has started this new working group

321
00:16:25.400 --> 00:16:28.700
that's supposed to be an enhancement to the way we manage safety

322
00:16:28.700 --> 00:16:31.200
to include SMS in the idea is that

323
00:16:31.200 --> 00:16:34.500
you know, we spend a lot of time as as Rod so

324
00:16:34.500 --> 00:16:37.900
well put had us put up that Iceberg picture, right?

325
00:16:37.900 --> 00:16:40.400
It gets us to the why why we

326
00:16:40.400 --> 00:16:43.300
doing this anyway, the why the why we're

327
00:16:43.300 --> 00:16:46.200
doing this is we need to identify those undesired States

328
00:16:46.200 --> 00:16:51.200
those 300 undesired states that might lead to the 29 injuries

329
00:16:49.200 --> 00:16:52.500
that might lead to the one fatal

330
00:16:52.500 --> 00:16:55.200
accident because those 300 undesired states

331
00:16:55.200 --> 00:16:58.400
are the same factors that go into an accident that or people

332
00:16:58.400 --> 00:17:03.200
lose their lives. So we want to get them while they're before they

333
00:17:03.200 --> 00:17:07.400
blossom. So to speak wouldn't dip them in the butt. Right? So but

334
00:17:06.400 --> 00:17:09.400

as as we look at how we go about

335
00:17:09.400 --> 00:17:12.600
this thing called SMS and identifying undesired States.

336
00:17:12.600 --> 00:17:15.400
We're realizing that we're missing the rest of the story.

337
00:17:15.400 --> 00:17:18.100
The rest of the story is every day. You're out there doing a great

338
00:17:18.100 --> 00:17:18.200
job.

339
00:17:19.100 --> 00:17:22.100
Probably 99.99% of time you're doing a great job.

340
00:17:22.100 --> 00:17:25.500
So the question is if you're doing a great job does everybody

341
00:17:25.500 --> 00:17:28.400
else doing a great job. Can they learn from you in the

342
00:17:28.400 --> 00:17:31.700
great job you're doing and that's learning from all operations. So that

343
00:17:31.700 --> 00:17:34.700
the idea is you have another opportunity to identify things

344
00:17:34.700 --> 00:17:37.600
that are going right that maybe everybody else isn't

345
00:17:37.600 --> 00:17:40.600
doing we call these resilient behaviors. So if

346
00:17:40.600 --> 00:17:43.200
on any given day the team is debriefing going you

347
00:17:43.200 --> 00:17:46.600
know, what we really did good today. We had a certain threat we managed

348
00:17:46.600 --> 00:17:49.300
it. Well, I'm not sure everybody manages at this. Well put that in

349
00:17:49.300 --> 00:17:52.200
your SMS, right and and let other

350
00:17:52.200 --> 00:17:55.400
people learn from that because SMS is all about why

351
00:17:55.400 --> 00:17:58.400
we doing this we want to identify and have information flow that

352
00:17:58.400 --> 00:18:01.200
can be meaningful for us to learn and continue to

353
00:18:01.200 --> 00:18:04.400
evolve we never get there. We never get there, but we

354
00:18:04.400 --> 00:18:07.400
need to promise to continue we evolving and and

355
00:18:07.400 --> 00:18:10.400
we can learn the best things. I've learned it to be the best

356
00:18:10.400 --> 00:18:13.300
pilot. I can be in the best safety manager. I could be is learning from
the good

357
00:18:13.300 --> 00:18:13.500
news.

358
00:18:14.200 --> 00:18:17.500
From other successful people. That's what's made me on

359
00:18:17.500 --> 00:18:20.600
my A-game not so much learning how somebody did

360
00:18:20.600 --> 00:18:23.400
something bad. Of course. We don't want to repeat the Bedford

361

00:18:23.400 --> 00:18:26.300
accident where people aren't doing flight control checks and they're doing you know,

362
00:18:26.300 --> 00:18:29.700
this lacks today school approach and unprofessional checklist

363
00:18:29.700 --> 00:18:32.400
discipline and stuff like that. But so there's

364
00:18:32.400 --> 00:18:33.300
two sides of this coin.

365
00:18:34.600 --> 00:18:38.300
Identify the things that are going well and you can measure that and these

366
00:18:37.300 --> 00:18:40.400
resilient behaviors also identify the

367
00:18:40.400 --> 00:18:43.600
things that are undesired States. This is the why we need

368
00:18:43.600 --> 00:18:46.900
to have these identify these identifying events so

369
00:18:46.900 --> 00:18:49.300
that we can do something about them before they evolve into

370
00:18:49.300 --> 00:18:49.900
something worse.

371
00:18:51.200 --> 00:18:54.000
I just want to piggyback on his point is

372
00:18:55.900 --> 00:18:58.700
that's one of the definitions I use for professionalism is

373
00:18:58.700 --> 00:19:01.300
you know, we said some of them earlier today

374

00:19:01.300 --> 00:19:04.400
with you know, how you behave without being watched while you're

375
00:19:04.400 --> 00:19:07.400
being watched but professionalism is to me as you

376
00:19:07.400 --> 00:19:09.800
plan your mission or your flight.

377
00:19:10.900 --> 00:19:13.200
All the way through and just close

378
00:19:13.200 --> 00:19:16.300
your eyes see it all the way to landing and where you park in the
aircraft again, and

379
00:19:16.300 --> 00:19:19.400
then you go out and real life and the idea is try to execute the

380
00:19:19.400 --> 00:19:22.900
plan just as you planned it. Well, the

381
00:19:22.900 --> 00:19:25.300
real world is you're gonna get a curveball here curveball there.

382
00:19:25.300 --> 00:19:29.100
Okay. Well, why didn't I catch that in my plan and maybe

383
00:19:28.100 --> 00:19:30.300
that's something to report.

384
00:19:31.100 --> 00:19:34.300
We're really happens is typically at the bar,

385
00:19:34.300 --> 00:19:37.500
you know at the end of the day is like you remember such and

386
00:19:37.500 --> 00:19:38.600
such, you know, well.

387
00:19:39.600 --> 00:19:41.500

If you're a team.

388
00:19:42.400 --> 00:19:45.200
Maybe it's wasn't that significant to you,

389
00:19:45.200 --> 00:19:48.400
but it might be a really big learning for you point for somebody

390
00:19:48.400 --> 00:19:51.600
else. So even when you're having the the bar debrief

391
00:19:51.600 --> 00:19:56.300
is like did we say anything that everyone should know about and

392
00:19:54.300 --> 00:19:57.600
share it just instead of

393
00:19:57.600 --> 00:19:59.600
just between the two or three of us, so

394
00:20:01.500 --> 00:20:04.900
I wanted to scratch on a concept of

395
00:20:04.900 --> 00:20:07.800
we have we talked about earlier in

396
00:20:07.800 --> 00:20:10.900
terms of quantity metrics for quantity

397
00:20:10.900 --> 00:20:12.900
measurements somebody mentioned.

398
00:20:14.100 --> 00:20:18.000
Increasing efficiency of the test process. I don't

399
00:20:17.700 --> 00:20:21.300
know specifically what you're after. I

400
00:20:20.300 --> 00:20:23.200
hold myself accountable to test plan

401
00:20:23.200 --> 00:20:24.800
reviews averaging two days.

402
00:20:26.100 --> 00:20:29.400
Now some test plans are harder than others. Now. What does a time-based?

403
00:20:30.200 --> 00:20:32.800
metric have the threat of

404
00:20:34.700 --> 00:20:35.500
rushing through it.

405
00:20:36.200 --> 00:20:39.100
And I find myself doing that. Sometimes a lot

406
00:20:39.100 --> 00:20:41.700
of times I'll get them and they'll want a one-day turnaround.

407
00:20:42.600 --> 00:20:45.100
And which to me is unfair there's a reason for

408
00:20:45.100 --> 00:20:48.200
that sometimes I get it but it can

409
00:20:48.200 --> 00:20:51.400
cause like I said bad behaviors. My question is

410
00:20:51.400 --> 00:20:54.300
is it possible to do a quality metric?

411
00:20:55.200 --> 00:20:58.300
Specifically, let's take the test plans for instance. So do

412
00:20:58.300 --> 00:21:00.900
you think I have a quality metric in my test plan reviews?

413
00:21:01.600 --> 00:21:02.300
Is it possible?

414
00:21:05.100 --> 00:21:06.000

Is it subjective?

415
00:21:08.100 --> 00:21:11.800
You can I can be quantitative, but it's primarily subjective.

416
00:21:11.800 --> 00:21:14.700
So when I read the risk

417
00:21:14.700 --> 00:21:17.800
assessment section, and I sense

418
00:21:17.800 --> 00:21:18.700
that it's a little light.

419
00:21:19.900 --> 00:21:22.200
And I noticed that the test plan we did

420
00:21:22.200 --> 00:21:25.900
in the previous program was very robust. Well

421
00:21:25.900 --> 00:21:28.200
that might signal me that perhaps we didn't

422
00:21:28.200 --> 00:21:31.400
do is is good a job as we could have on this

423
00:21:31.400 --> 00:21:34.200
program's test plan for the very same type of

424
00:21:34.200 --> 00:21:37.300
testing that we're about to embark on. I just throw

425
00:21:37.300 --> 00:21:39.500
that out there is when you do your objectives

426
00:21:40.300 --> 00:21:43.900
You kind of I think have to weigh what you're

427
00:21:43.900 --> 00:21:46.500
trying to achieve and if it's just pure quantity that

428
00:21:46.500 --> 00:21:49.800
you can erode quality. If you're not careful and

429
00:21:49.800 --> 00:21:53.200
much like the the tcir. I've

430
00:21:52.200 --> 00:21:55.900
seen it we've seen people in the bathrooms patching

431
00:21:55.900 --> 00:21:56.500
themselves up.

432
00:21:57.300 --> 00:21:59.400
Because they didn't want to ruin the record.

433
00:22:00.200 --> 00:22:02.600
So just something to throw out there.

434
00:22:04.800 --> 00:22:07.500
Before we wrap up Terry Lutz

435
00:22:07.500 --> 00:22:10.300
had approached me earlier this morning. I'm

436
00:22:10.300 --> 00:22:13.700
not sure Terry if you still wanted to share the very relevant

437
00:22:13.700 --> 00:22:16.400
comments that you had kind of just dot pointed

438
00:22:16.400 --> 00:22:19.100
for me quickly as we as we close.

439
00:22:20.200 --> 00:22:23.200
I'm from the session earlier this morning.

440
00:22:23.200 --> 00:22:26.900
I came up with what might be new subjects for, you

441
00:22:26.900 --> 00:22:29.500

know later on in this this Workshop or

442
00:22:29.500 --> 00:22:31.400
maybe for the next Workshop, but

443
00:22:32.700 --> 00:22:35.600
How do you deal with situations that split the

444
00:22:35.600 --> 00:22:37.800
flight test team? Let's say that.

445
00:22:39.600 --> 00:22:43.000
Somebody shows up for work and in somebody

446
00:22:42.300 --> 00:22:45.400
in the flight test team knows that they are out

447
00:22:45.400 --> 00:22:46.000
of crew rest.

448
00:22:46.700 --> 00:22:50.400
How do you handle that? Do you if that

449
00:22:50.400 --> 00:22:53.100
becomes an issue among the flight test team, there may be a group of

450
00:22:53.100 --> 00:22:56.200
people that say I support his decision and there may

451
00:22:56.200 --> 00:22:59.300
be another group of people say I do not support that position.

452
00:23:00.100 --> 00:23:03.600
It's not the issue itself. That's the problem. It's that

453
00:23:03.600 --> 00:23:06.200
the division that's created among the flight test

454
00:23:06.200 --> 00:23:09.300
organization and a decay in the amount of trust that

455
00:23:09.300 --> 00:23:12.400
you have in one another and that's a that's a very real problem

456
00:23:12.400 --> 00:23:15.000
in certain cases that I'm aware of.

457
00:23:16.300 --> 00:23:19.600
How do you just Define levels

458
00:23:19.600 --> 00:23:22.400
of incidence? So that proper safety

459
00:23:22.400 --> 00:23:25.500
reviews are done. In other words is this point to

460
00:23:25.500 --> 00:23:28.300
G flap excedance is at a

461
00:23:28.300 --> 00:23:31.200
minor exceedance. What would be a major

462
00:23:31.200 --> 00:23:34.700
exceed in how would you differ in the way you approached different

463
00:23:34.700 --> 00:23:37.700
levels of exceedance in the safety aspect of

464
00:23:37.700 --> 00:23:38.300
flight test

465
00:23:39.300 --> 00:23:41.600
and then the last thing that I thought of is

466
00:23:42.300 --> 00:23:45.100
we're we're seeing in the Aerospace industry a lot

467
00:23:45.100 --> 00:23:48.400
of small companies, you know, they may have five people

468
00:23:48.400 --> 00:23:51.800

10 people, you know and standing

469
00:23:51.800 --> 00:23:54.300
up a flight disorganization. They don't have any

470
00:23:54.300 --> 00:23:57.900
any of this background knowledge. So, how

471
00:23:57.900 --> 00:24:00.500
do we how do we help them to stand up

472
00:24:00.500 --> 00:24:03.500
an SMS for a very small organization where

473
00:24:03.500 --> 00:24:06.500
they have just you know, a small number of people. So those

474
00:24:06.500 --> 00:24:09.100
are my comments that don't have to be addressed here,

475
00:24:09.100 --> 00:24:11.400
but maybe for the next Workshop we could

476
00:24:12.800 --> 00:24:16.600
Yeah that those were excellent points Terry. Thanks for sharing those
like

477
00:24:15.600 --> 00:24:18.500
I mentioned earlier small departments

478
00:24:18.500 --> 00:24:19.500
are really tough.

479
00:24:21.500 --> 00:24:24.300
But there's some work being done specifically to address this

480
00:24:24.300 --> 00:24:27.300
MBA say NBAA Safety Committee is working

481
00:24:27.300 --> 00:24:30.900
on small flight Department virtual flight Department

482
00:24:30.900 --> 00:24:33.300
efforts. I'm looking at

483
00:24:33.300 --> 00:24:36.200
the ability to for an auditor to get

484
00:24:36.200 --> 00:24:39.300
a folkwood download that has everything kind of

485
00:24:39.300 --> 00:24:42.200
already prepackaged that they

486
00:24:42.200 --> 00:24:45.200
could use ahead of an audit to maybe help them

487
00:24:45.200 --> 00:24:48.300
out and ask some pointy questions when they go to a organization to

488
00:24:48.300 --> 00:24:51.800
do an audit. So there's a lot of work in this area being done don't

489
00:24:51.800 --> 00:24:54.100
have all the answers, but hopefully that will help. Hey Tom,

490
00:24:54.100 --> 00:24:57.800
I want to own a throw something out there for people especially leaders to

491
00:24:57.800 --> 00:25:00.200
ponder along with Terry's comment about

492
00:25:00.200 --> 00:25:03.300
splitting a team and decades ago.

493
00:25:03.300 --> 00:25:07.200
I was on a missile program where I had a really forward-thinking second

494
00:25:06.200 --> 00:25:09.400
level manager and his philosophy

495
00:25:09.400 --> 00:25:11.300
was he wanted to be three deep?

496
00:25:12.400 --> 00:25:15.500
In every discipline he needed he wanted to cross

497
00:25:15.500 --> 00:25:18.200
train enough people so that he had three people that could

498
00:25:18.200 --> 00:25:22.400
do anyone function that way Joel could

499
00:25:22.400 --> 00:25:25.400
be on vacation Len could call in sick and Pete

500
00:25:25.400 --> 00:25:28.800
could support the missile shot. I recognize especially

501
00:25:28.800 --> 00:25:31.500
with Terry's talking about on small teams. That may

502
00:25:31.500 --> 00:25:32.200
not be possible.

503
00:25:33.700 --> 00:25:36.200
However, if you really look at it

504
00:25:36.200 --> 00:25:39.000
and cross train people it saves the day.

505
00:25:40.600 --> 00:25:44.400
So I want to throw that out there as a nugget a

506
00:25:43.400 --> 00:25:46.500
seed for flight test teams to

507
00:25:46.500 --> 00:25:46.800
think about.

508
00:25:47.700 --> 00:25:50.500

Developing that that cross pollination and cross

509
00:25:50.500 --> 00:25:53.200
training so that when you do have an event that

510
00:25:53.200 --> 00:25:54.400
kind of splits a team.

511
00:25:55.100 --> 00:25:58.400
You have a success plan where it can

512
00:25:58.400 --> 00:26:00.200
go forward and the mission is saved.

513
00:26:02.100 --> 00:26:05.300
Outstanding so here's my key takeaways for

514
00:26:05.300 --> 00:26:05.600
the day.

515
00:26:07.200 --> 00:26:11.100
As I mentioned this safety business is a team sport. So

516
00:26:10.100 --> 00:26:14.100
without the proper leadership support

517
00:26:13.100 --> 00:26:16.700
and direction as well

518
00:26:16.700 --> 00:26:20.100
as the engagement of the influencers individual

519
00:26:19.100 --> 00:26:22.400
contributors, your programs. Probably not

520
00:26:22.400 --> 00:26:25.500
going to give you the results that you want. I think we we

521
00:26:25.500 --> 00:26:28.400
did Hammer home culture and hopefully you can take that back

522
00:26:28.400 --> 00:26:32.800
and kind of assess your your own home-based organizations.

523
00:26:32.800 --> 00:26:35.600
Most of you said that she thought you had a positive safety culture.

524
00:26:35.600 --> 00:26:38.400
There's always room to improve. So I applaud

525
00:26:38.400 --> 00:26:41.400
you for getting to where you are on your culture journey

526
00:26:41.400 --> 00:26:44.600
and would encourage you to keep pressing forward and share with

527
00:26:44.600 --> 00:26:47.100
others on how to achieve that safety Nirvana.

528
00:26:47.800 --> 00:26:50.300
We talked about leaders walking the talk.

529
00:26:50.300 --> 00:26:53.700
That's non negotiable and Uncle huffer's book. You need

530
00:26:53.700 --> 00:26:57.100
to measure to improve and we already

531
00:26:56.100 --> 00:26:58.000
went over the handout.

532
00:26:59.300 --> 00:27:02.200
I have a couple of thank yous number one. I want to point out to

533
00:27:02.200 --> 00:27:07.100
Bruce remek. He is our flight test Safety Committee Workshop chair

534
00:27:06.100 --> 00:27:09.200
subcommittee chairman. So we

535
00:27:09.200 --> 00:27:14.600

finally have one of those now so we maintains continuity with our
workshops Pete

536
00:27:12.600 --> 00:27:15.200
don't ask appreciate

537
00:27:15.200 --> 00:27:18.800
the help. So both those gentlemen and their writing on the whiteboards

538
00:27:18.800 --> 00:27:21.300
today and we've got those around the room and we've got those

539
00:27:21.300 --> 00:27:25.300
photographed for posterity and then

540
00:27:25.300 --> 00:27:28.200
my panel of experts Rod hoyte. I appreciate all

541
00:27:28.200 --> 00:27:31.700
the help as usual Sunny Bates. Fantastic. Thank

542
00:27:31.700 --> 00:27:35.000
you for joining us today Walter gajalus really

543
00:27:34.700 --> 00:27:37.400
fantastic that that we had these fine

544
00:27:37.400 --> 00:27:40.300
gentlemen contributing today and sharing

545
00:27:40.300 --> 00:27:43.500
their expertise invest knowledge. Remember there's

546
00:27:43.500 --> 00:27:46.300
always help available. So you

547
00:27:46.300 --> 00:27:49.100
saw turbo slide with all the people that

548
00:27:49.100 --> 00:27:52.300
are currently affiliated with the flight test Safety Committee

549
00:27:52.300 --> 00:27:55.300
and then there are those that have already served their term on

550
00:27:55.300 --> 00:27:58.300
the flight test Safety Committee and our eager to help so we're just

551
00:27:58.300 --> 00:27:59.000
an email.

552
00:27:59.300 --> 00:28:02.900
Call away. I've done several benchmarking sessions

553
00:28:02.900 --> 00:28:05.300
with various manufacturers. I found that very helpful.

554
00:28:05.300 --> 00:28:08.200
So that could be very helpful for you

555
00:28:08.200 --> 00:28:11.200
all as well. Depending upon where you are on your journey. If you're going

556
00:28:11.200 --> 00:28:14.500
to pursue a voluntary SMS accepted program with the FAA.

557
00:28:14.500 --> 00:28:18.000
That's a good opportunity to do that. Want to

558
00:28:17.100 --> 00:28:20.900
thank the staff Claude great job with AVS appreciate

559
00:28:20.900 --> 00:28:23.300
that and I think at this

560
00:28:23.300 --> 00:28:25.900
point I'm supposed to turn it over to you Glenn.

561
00:28:29.200 --> 00:28:30.700
Thanks for engagement today. Really? Appreciate it.