

WEBVTT

1

00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:02.765

Just a, what I call a wake up brief on the number

2

00:00:02.765 --> 00:00:04.485

of accidents we've been having in flight test.

3

00:00:04.885 --> 00:00:07.125

Imposing the question about what we can do to try

4

00:00:07.125 --> 00:00:09.675

to stem this, this abysmal record.

5

00:00:11.455 --> 00:00:14.025

I think we know the risks that are listed here.

6

00:00:14.705 --> 00:00:16.765

Um, a lot of companies, especially bigger ones,

7

00:00:16.765 --> 00:00:18.765

are resilient enough to whether the storm not all are,

8

00:00:19.305 --> 00:00:22.325

but still most of these accents,

9

00:00:22.325 --> 00:00:23.685

I would say all of 'em are avoidable.

10

00:00:24.235 --> 00:00:26.215

And that's why the military calls 'em mishaps.

11

00:00:27.795 --> 00:00:30.765

It's tough to figure out what actually happened.

12

00:00:30.925 --> 00:00:33.495

I mean, you see a lot of media reporting

13

00:00:33.875 --> 00:00:36.855

and it's simply not factual in a lot of cases.

14
00:00:36.955 --> 00:00:39.255
And so you have to be careful which content you're consuming

15
00:00:39.485 --> 00:00:40.535
related to these things.

16
00:00:40.595 --> 00:00:43.055
But there's so many lessons learned that we need to share.

17
00:00:43.235 --> 00:00:46.095
So it's really up to those of us in this room

18
00:00:46.445 --> 00:00:47.815
that may have some information

19
00:00:47.875 --> 00:00:51.055
and trying to kindly coerce our

20
00:00:51.855 --> 00:00:54.055
communications folks at our respective organizations

21
00:00:54.115 --> 00:00:57.615
to at least allow us to discuss critical pieces

22
00:00:57.615 --> 00:00:59.655
of information that could make our business safe.

23
00:01:01.675 --> 00:01:02.815
So I started, uh,

24
00:01:02.815 --> 00:01:05.825
basically eight years ago, uh, looking at these things.

25
00:01:05.825 --> 00:01:07.585
And I started with our own G six accident.

26
00:01:07.705 --> 00:01:08.785
'cause I didn't want anybody to accuse

27
00:01:08.785 --> 00:01:09.825

me that I was picking on them.

28

00:01:10.495 --> 00:01:13.175

Um, but I'm just gonna scroll through these

29

00:01:13.275 --> 00:01:14.895

and I'm not really gonna talk about 'em.

30

00:01:14.895 --> 00:01:19.105

But a lot of our friends

31

00:01:19.105 --> 00:01:20.705

and colleagues were lost in some of these acts.

32

00:01:21.085 --> 00:01:22.315

There were some close calls

33

00:01:22.815 --> 00:01:24.595

and really it was only a matter of luck

34

00:01:25.485 --> 00:01:27.745

making the difference between fatality and not.

35

00:01:32.695 --> 00:01:34.395

And I would say that the majority of these,

36

00:01:34.795 --> 00:01:37.475

I have no clue on what was really causal behind them.

37

00:01:37.495 --> 00:01:39.275

And again, that's why I go back to the knowledge piece.

38

00:01:39.275 --> 00:01:40.675

That's the power in all of this.

39

00:01:41.235 --> 00:01:43.405

It's the control parameter, as Beaker would say,

40

00:01:43.755 --> 00:01:45.055

in trying to prevent these things.

41
00:01:46.805 --> 00:01:49.905
And I've included air demonstration accidents

42
00:01:49.905 --> 00:01:52.625
that included some of our, uh, flight test.

43
00:01:52.805 --> 00:01:55.835
Uh, brothers and sisters I think are important to highlight

44
00:01:55.835 --> 00:01:57.955
as well because flight testers do get involved in

45
00:01:57.955 --> 00:01:59.035
these types of activities.

46
00:01:59.995 --> 00:02:03.635
I mean, there is a good way to do those types of, of events

47
00:02:03.745 --> 00:02:05.355
that are arguably high risk

48
00:02:05.985 --> 00:02:07.525
and, uh, need to be done in methodical manner.

49
00:02:07.525 --> 00:02:10.275
There's new technology.

50
00:02:10.495 --> 00:02:11.915
So really here is the,

51
00:02:12.055 --> 00:02:15.195
the line in the sand from last year through this year.

52
00:02:15.915 --> 00:02:17.615
Um, I think this is in,

53
00:02:17.615 --> 00:02:19.215
this will be an interesting accident if we can get

54
00:02:19.215 --> 00:02:21.055

information on it about, uh, batteries,

55

00:02:22.155 --> 00:02:22.915
electrical systems in these,

56

00:02:27.085 --> 00:02:27.855
some close calls.

57

00:02:28.215 --> 00:02:31.095
Interestingly, uh, some of these folks had no idea that, uh,

58

00:02:31.215 --> 00:02:32.815
EAA was there and had resources.

59

00:02:32.815 --> 00:02:35.615
The a a just published their flight test guide

60

00:02:35.615 --> 00:02:36.845
and checklists.

61

00:02:37.285 --> 00:02:39.365
Excellent product that's only 18 bucks.

62

00:02:41.225 --> 00:02:44.165
An excellent resource for light journal aviation experiment,

63

00:02:44.165 --> 00:02:47.365
experimental amateur bill community to make them safe.

64

00:02:47.645 --> 00:02:50.755
By the way, speaking of the EAA, um, I'm trying

65

00:02:50.755 --> 00:02:51.795
to remember the statistics,

66

00:02:51.795 --> 00:02:52.635
but I think it's better than

67

00:02:52.635 --> 00:02:54.595
37% reduction in the last 10 years.

68

00:02:54.885 --> 00:02:55.885

Experimental amateur bill.

69

00:02:56.805 --> 00:02:58.405

Terry's nodding his head in the affirmatives.

70

00:02:58.515 --> 00:03:00.005

I think that's close, close, maybe

71

00:03:00.005 --> 00:03:01.045

better than that actually.

72

00:03:01.185 --> 00:03:05.515

But that, that's real numbers, that's real prevention

73

00:03:05.515 --> 00:03:08.895

of accidents, that's lives saved, deaths avoided.

74

00:03:12.045 --> 00:03:14.995

And then the 2 0 6 b most recently in Arizona.

75

00:03:17.255 --> 00:03:18.755

So the box score doesn't look good, folks.

76

00:03:19.095 --> 00:03:21.595

Um, the numbers keep going up

77

00:03:21.975 --> 00:03:25.025

and we've lost 29 lives here just in the last eight years.

78

00:03:25.645 --> 00:03:27.425

So this, this is not an accident rate

79

00:03:27.425 --> 00:03:28.905

that we would ever want published anywhere.

80

00:03:31.235 --> 00:03:32.855

The microscope's really not on us.

81

00:03:32.915 --> 00:03:35.895

So I'm asking us to put the microscope on us

82

00:03:35.895 --> 00:03:38.515

and ask the tough questions about what's really going on.

83

00:03:38.775 --> 00:03:40.915

Are we not doing a sufficient job in identifying

84

00:03:40.915 --> 00:03:41.955

hazards and mitigating risk?

85

00:03:42.955 --> 00:03:44.495

Are they really unknown unknowns out there

86

00:03:44.495 --> 00:03:46.015

that we just haven't accommodated

87

00:03:46.015 --> 00:03:47.335

and are new complex systems,

88

00:03:47.475 --> 00:03:49.295

new novel equipment that we're trying to field?

89

00:03:50.065 --> 00:03:52.365

Or are we doing poorly in planning and execution?

90

00:03:53.325 --> 00:03:56.385

And then lastly, do I go back

91

00:03:56.385 --> 00:03:58.345

and forth with, uh, Sandy Sandberg?

92

00:03:58.345 --> 00:04:00.265

Many of you know Sandy, I think he actually has a

93

00:04:00.265 --> 00:04:02.405

presentation called Matt as hell or Matt Attack.

94

00:04:02.405 --> 00:04:05.055

He's, um,

95

00:04:05.155 --> 00:04:08.755

but it, it's based on this 1976, uh, network.

96

00:04:10.955 --> 00:04:12.015

And, and I always laugh

97

00:04:12.015 --> 00:04:14.095

because in the subject line, when he sends stuff to me

98

00:04:14.435 --> 00:04:16.135

and I know what it, what it really is about,

99

00:04:17.605 --> 00:04:20.865

Oh, I want you to get up now.

100

00:04:22.145 --> 00:04:24.145

I want all of you to get up out of your chest.

101

00:04:25.445 --> 00:04:29.325

I want you to get up right now and go to the window, open it

102

00:04:29.825 --> 00:04:33.845

and stick your head out and yell, I miss mad as hell

103

00:04:34.105 --> 00:04:35.885

and I'm not gonna take this anymore.

104

00:04:37.445 --> 00:04:40.015

Alright, well that's, that's really about the extent

105

00:04:40.015 --> 00:04:44.515

of the levity that I'm gonna offer for today's, uh, Toro.

106

00:04:44.895 --> 00:04:47.435

But uh, yeah, Sandy puts Matt as hell in the,

107

00:04:47.495 --> 00:04:49.635

in the subject line of these things when he sends it to me

108

00:04:49.895 --> 00:04:52.275

and we read stuff about these accidents

109

00:04:52.275 --> 00:04:53.915

that just make you shake your head.

110

00:04:54.345 --> 00:04:56.315

Some of 'em would, would qualify quite

111

00:04:56.315 --> 00:04:57.395

well for the Darwin ward.

112

00:04:58.175 --> 00:05:01.555

Um, but anyway, moving on to safety assurance.

113

00:05:01.575 --> 00:05:03.315

So here's an element that arguably

114

00:05:03.335 --> 00:05:07.395

for your more classic part 91, 1 35 operation, um,

115

00:05:08.895 --> 00:05:12.505

applies when we're bringing over stuff from his o the

116

00:05:12.505 --> 00:05:16.555

international standard for ization organization, uh,

117

00:05:17.105 --> 00:05:19.075

related to safety management system.

118

00:05:19.625 --> 00:05:20.675

This is component three.

119

00:05:21.095 --> 00:05:24.515

So for this afternoon, here's our objectives, uh,

120

00:05:24.515 --> 00:05:25.515

and there's a lot of 'em.

121

00:05:25.655 --> 00:05:27.035

So these are noble goals for us,

122
00:05:27.385 --> 00:05:29.645
but these are what we want to be held accountable

123
00:05:29.645 --> 00:05:31.645
to in trying to deliver content for you this afternoon.

124
00:05:31.705 --> 00:05:34.525
And I think we've got the pros from Dover to do just that.

125
00:05:35.755 --> 00:05:38.655
Here's the agenda. So shortly I'm gonna turn this program

126
00:05:38.765 --> 00:05:41.215
over to Rod and he is eminently

127
00:05:41.215 --> 00:05:42.905
qualified to talk about these things.

128
00:05:43.025 --> 00:05:46.315
He's an expert. And then I've got Ken Neubauer

129
00:05:46.315 --> 00:05:48.135
and I'm gonna introduce him a little later.

130
00:05:48.275 --> 00:05:50.655
And then we're gonna finish up the day with a group exercise

131
00:05:50.655 --> 00:05:52.085
that Rod has in store.

132
00:05:52.145 --> 00:05:53.335
So that's our plan.

133
00:05:53.755 --> 00:05:57.605
So what we really don't want is having singular people,

134
00:05:57.825 --> 00:06:00.165
one safety officer in your organization holding up the

135
00:06:00.325 --> 00:06:03.825

entirety of the S-M-S-S-M-S is predicated on top down

136

00:06:04.325 --> 00:06:05.395

management of safety.

137

00:06:05.915 --> 00:06:08.135

You gotta have support from the C-suite.

138

00:06:08.195 --> 00:06:12.395

So I don't think you got much there except the paper tiger.

139

00:06:13.145 --> 00:06:15.405

And really this is underpinned by culture.

140

00:06:16.105 --> 00:06:17.235

Culture's not set right.

141

00:06:17.295 --> 00:06:19.155

You're just not gonna get the safety performance

142

00:06:19.155 --> 00:06:21.075

that you expect and you're naturally gonna get people

143

00:06:21.075 --> 00:06:23.435

wondering what they're getting for their SMS money.

144

00:06:23.775 --> 00:06:25.195

And that's not a good situation.

145

00:06:27.585 --> 00:06:32.555

Notice I put the orange on the sash there. Catch that.

146

00:06:32.555 --> 00:06:35.005

You see what I did there? Ah, yeah.

147

00:06:35.915 --> 00:06:38.475

It can apply to flight test. There are ways to do it.

148

00:06:38.835 --> 00:06:40.795

I agree. This is kind of new novel

149
00:06:40.815 --> 00:06:44.235
for flight test organization adapting safety management

150
00:06:44.235 --> 00:06:47.665
system philosophies and techniques to flight test organ.

151
00:06:48.745 --> 00:06:50.285
But I think we have to get on this journey.

152
00:06:50.465 --> 00:06:53.285
Uh, I don't think SMS is going away unlike TQM,

153
00:06:53.545 --> 00:06:55.645
but if you stick your nose in the safety management manual

154
00:06:55.645 --> 00:06:57.965
that's published by IKO, this is what you're gonna see.

155
00:06:58.215 --> 00:07:00.815
Three main points, monitoring

156
00:07:00.815 --> 00:07:03.775
and measurement management of change, continuous improvement

157
00:07:03.775 --> 00:07:06.545
of the SMS management of change, change management planning.

158
00:07:07.155 --> 00:07:09.905
So organizations change is inevitable.

159
00:07:10.205 --> 00:07:11.385
The question is, are you doing

160
00:07:11.445 --> 00:07:12.625
any change management planning?

161
00:07:12.645 --> 00:07:15.025
So disruption in senior leadership positions within your

162
00:07:15.265 --> 00:07:17.905

companies and organizations are, are you doing a risk

163

00:07:17.905 --> 00:07:19.755

of profile to find out if you have

164

00:07:19.755 --> 00:07:21.275

continuity with the expertise?

165

00:07:21.685 --> 00:07:22.845

Great questions.

166

00:07:23.385 --> 00:07:24.975

These are the type of things you should be

167

00:07:24.975 --> 00:07:26.335

asked if you're getting audited.

168

00:07:27.705 --> 00:07:30.805

And I know we don't like to be audited and we can soften

169

00:07:30.805 --> 00:07:33.395

and I guess be calling assessing, but it is what it is

170

00:07:34.135 --> 00:07:35.475

and we should welcome it actually.

171

00:07:35.475 --> 00:07:37.035

And this is to me an industry problem.

172

00:07:37.765 --> 00:07:40.265

It, it's, um, you know, not just flight tests,

173

00:07:40.365 --> 00:07:43.885

but what we're seeing, uh, especially in business aviation,

174

00:07:44.495 --> 00:07:48.905

which is still voluntary to do SMS on the 1 21 guys, um,

175

00:07:49.685 --> 00:07:52.785

is not being really critiqued that that intently

176

00:07:52.785 --> 00:07:53.825
during auditing.

177

00:07:55.165 --> 00:07:56.945
And I think what's, what's happening is you,

178

00:07:56.965 --> 00:07:58.225
you get flowering reports

179

00:07:58.285 --> 00:08:00.665
and people bragging about getting a certificate on the wall

180

00:08:00.885 --> 00:08:04.545
rather than actually soliciting really tough feedback,

181

00:08:04.865 --> 00:08:06.305
critical feedback on how we're doing.

182

00:08:07.745 --> 00:08:10.685
And then what, we're maybe a little bit shy

183

00:08:10.685 --> 00:08:13.165
because those results are gonna have to go to our boss.

184

00:08:13.595 --> 00:08:15.735
And you can see that the behaviors are happening here.

185

00:08:15.735 --> 00:08:17.015
We want a good report card.

186

00:08:17.655 --> 00:08:18.695
'cause we don't want the boss to

187

00:08:18.885 --> 00:08:20.215
make a bunch of go do's for us.

188

00:08:21.315 --> 00:08:23.365
It's just not having the, the, the impact

189

00:08:23.365 --> 00:08:24.445

that we need by doing.

190

00:08:26.245 --> 00:08:28.875

Um, so as part of one

191

00:08:28.875 --> 00:08:31.955

of our offerings on flight test safety.org, uh,

192

00:08:32.055 --> 00:08:33.435

Ben Luther really deserves the

193

00:08:33.435 --> 00:08:34.515

lion's share of credit on this.

194

00:08:34.655 --> 00:08:37.595

But, uh, we worked on this to create a tailored

195

00:08:37.615 --> 00:08:40.035

to auditing protocol for flight test organizations.

196

00:08:40.135 --> 00:08:44.855

And this is just merely a screenshot out of that protocol.

197

00:08:45.075 --> 00:08:47.375

And it was based on the Safety Management

198

00:08:47.375 --> 00:08:48.975

International collaborative group.

199

00:08:49.435 --> 00:08:51.525

Smk, okay? It's a non-licensed product

200

00:08:51.545 --> 00:08:52.565

and that's why we used it.

201

00:08:52.585 --> 00:08:54.925

We were using it internal to our company anyway.

202

00:08:55.505 --> 00:08:57.795

So it was natural just to adapt it for this cause

203
00:08:58.415 --> 00:09:00.755
Rod has actually adapted the is BO standard

204
00:09:00.815 --> 00:09:02.185
for flight test organizations

205
00:09:02.245 --> 00:09:03.825
and both of those are available to you.

206
00:09:05.225 --> 00:09:08.365
So I only know, uh, one organization

207
00:09:08.365 --> 00:09:10.565
that's actually been audited against either one

208
00:09:10.565 --> 00:09:12.855
of those standards we need to do better.

209
00:09:13.675 --> 00:09:15.715
I encourage you to, to use it.

210
00:09:16.175 --> 00:09:18.315
Um, beta test it give us the feedback.

211
00:09:21.285 --> 00:09:24.095
So we ask why, why are we needing to measure?

212
00:09:24.585 --> 00:09:26.815
Um, I think a lot of us, a lot

213
00:09:26.815 --> 00:09:30.015
of organizations are probably stuck with total case injury.

214
00:09:30.555 --> 00:09:31.895
Uh, and those types of metrics,

215
00:09:31.905 --> 00:09:32.935
those are industrial metrics.

216
00:09:32.945 --> 00:09:36.095

Those are required for occupational safety

217

00:09:36.115 --> 00:09:39.105

and health standards and compliance.

218

00:09:39.885 --> 00:09:41.805

Uh, we have to measure

219

00:09:42.045 --> 00:09:43.845

'cause we want to make sure that there's conformance

220

00:09:43.845 --> 00:09:47.045

to SMS the basic underpinnings of SMS.

221

00:09:47.665 --> 00:09:49.725

And then I think we, we can all agree that

222

00:09:49.725 --> 00:09:51.645

what you measure can actually get improved.

223

00:09:52.845 --> 00:09:55.145

Um, so here's the, really the the burning question.

224

00:09:56.285 --> 00:09:58.885

Tate monitoring, focal classic flight operations,

225

00:09:58.885 --> 00:10:00.485

quality assurance type of activity.

226

00:10:00.955 --> 00:10:04.095

We do it in the, in normal flight operations activities,

227

00:10:04.435 --> 00:10:06.375

but why aren't we doing it in flight test?

228

00:10:07.005 --> 00:10:08.345

You could make a strong argument

229

00:10:08.655 --> 00:10:11.505

that our telemetry data could be an Uber foca program.

230
00:10:13.325 --> 00:10:15.945
The question still becomes what happens when we cease test,

231
00:10:16.385 --> 00:10:19.825
complete test and where our t should we still be monitoring

232
00:10:19.825 --> 00:10:22.075
data and looking for unstable approach rates

233
00:10:22.075 --> 00:10:23.355
and those kinds of things that are typical.

234
00:10:24.465 --> 00:10:26.605
Um, I'm not sure that we're really doing that.

235
00:10:28.925 --> 00:10:32.195
So here's something that I, I did for our own company,

236
00:10:32.455 --> 00:10:34.875
and this is really SMS 1.0 type of stuff,

237
00:10:34.975 --> 00:10:36.065
just simple metrics

238
00:10:36.065 --> 00:10:38.145
that you can apply a stoplight chart too.

239
00:10:38.775 --> 00:10:40.995
And, uh, I know there's a lot of words on this chart,

240
00:10:41.055 --> 00:10:44.395
but I I organize these into SMS components just

241
00:10:44.395 --> 00:10:45.475
to make things a little bit easier.

242
00:10:45.535 --> 00:10:46.715
So you can just kind of work your way

243
00:10:46.715 --> 00:10:49.145

through the SMS number one policy.

244

00:10:49.735 --> 00:10:52.275

Did, did you review your policy annually

245

00:10:52.375 --> 00:10:53.995

and just see if you wanted to update anything?

246

00:10:53.995 --> 00:10:55.915

Technically you're supposed to update the targets in there.

247

00:10:55.915 --> 00:10:58.695

The safety performance targets updated in there,

248

00:10:59.365 --> 00:11:02.065

or is your safety policy letter still signed by the guy

249

00:11:02.065 --> 00:11:03.985

that's three previous bosses ago?

250

00:11:04.845 --> 00:11:07.115

Well, that's not good. Um,

251

00:11:07.665 --> 00:11:09.515

conduct a comprehensive ERP drill.

252

00:11:09.515 --> 00:11:12.705

Well, we talked about that and I asked the question lot,

253

00:11:12.725 --> 00:11:13.825

not a lot of hands went up.

254

00:11:14.825 --> 00:11:19.015

So you can, I think scale the level of your ERP drill.

255

00:11:19.055 --> 00:11:21.095

That's certainly reasonable tail tabletops.

256

00:11:21.435 --> 00:11:23.175

I'm not that big a fan of it,

257

00:11:23.235 --> 00:11:25.655

but some organizations do do tabletops.

258

00:11:25.655 --> 00:11:26.775

They still could have a place,

259

00:11:27.315 --> 00:11:31.305

but I still want to see the objectives explicitly stated.

260

00:11:31.935 --> 00:11:34.815

What are we trying to do? So the next one that I want

261

00:11:34.815 --> 00:11:36.895

to see, I want to see a crisis communications module

262

00:11:36.915 --> 00:11:40.175

and I wanna see a family assistance module bolted onto,

263

00:11:40.605 --> 00:11:42.295

otherwise, you're,

264

00:11:42.455 --> 00:11:45.685

you're still red doesn't pass most management.

265

00:11:45.685 --> 00:11:48.405

You can read this thing. Are you into the risk register?

266

00:11:48.425 --> 00:11:49.525

Are you looking at the reports?

267

00:11:49.665 --> 00:11:51.245

Are you tracking the corrective actions?

268

00:11:51.245 --> 00:11:52.245

Are they completed or not?

269

00:11:53.235 --> 00:11:55.055

One of the tricks that I like to do is I like

270

00:11:55.055 --> 00:11:57.645

to ask the respective business unit VP

271

00:11:58.085 --> 00:12:01.235

and their respective safety officer, what's the top three

272

00:12:01.255 --> 00:12:03.625

to five things that keep you up at night related to safety?

273

00:12:04.845 --> 00:12:07.305

And I don't want them to collaborate on it, I just want them

274

00:12:07.305 --> 00:12:10.575

to tell me what those three to five things compare it.

275

00:12:10.875 --> 00:12:12.175

And then I want to compare that

276

00:12:12.205 --> 00:12:13.455

with the other business units

277

00:12:13.755 --> 00:12:15.375

and see if there's some commonality

278

00:12:15.835 --> 00:12:18.055

and then we can decide if we're doing enough in those here.

279

00:12:18.745 --> 00:12:22.315

It, it can be an eyeopening effort.

280

00:12:23.495 --> 00:12:26.165

Their safety assurance co conducting the SMS audit.

281

00:12:26.285 --> 00:12:28.565

I always think that a culture ser survey should precede it.

282

00:12:28.625 --> 00:12:32.875

And that's why Ken Neubauer, he is an expert on surveying,

283

00:12:33.095 --> 00:12:36.265

uh, with navy, uh, safety center.

284
00:12:37.025 --> 00:12:39.355
Okay? And then incorporating three quarters,

285
00:12:39.515 --> 00:12:41.675
at least three quarters of the recommend.

286
00:12:41.675 --> 00:12:43.355
Hey, you may not agree with each

287
00:12:43.355 --> 00:12:44.435
of the audit recommendations

288
00:12:44.495 --> 00:12:46.255
and that's perfectly fine as long

289
00:12:46.255 --> 00:12:48.595
as you address them and explain what which.

290
00:12:50.795 --> 00:12:51.895
And then lastly, promotion.

291
00:12:51.895 --> 00:12:55.855
You send in people to safety things like, and I commend you

292
00:12:55.855 --> 00:12:59.295
and your host organizations for sending you to Charleston

293
00:12:59.935 --> 00:13:01.715
or your desire to get to Charleston.

294
00:13:01.715 --> 00:13:04.875
And they, and they agreed, uh, because it is important.

295
00:13:04.895 --> 00:13:08.835
And you can see this is a low bar people just at least 1%

296
00:13:08.835 --> 00:13:11.155
of your organization to go to technical training

297
00:13:11.435 --> 00:13:13.555

because if you're technically competent,

298

00:13:13.635 --> 00:13:14.715

I submit, you're still safer.

299

00:13:15.215 --> 00:13:18.305

So that still passes with this basic SMS metric.

300

00:13:19.085 --> 00:13:21.835

Okay, here's the SMS journey.

301

00:13:21.835 --> 00:13:24.195

Again, this is right out of the safety management manual.

302

00:13:24.295 --> 00:13:26.355

So this is what auditors should be looking for.

303

00:13:26.355 --> 00:13:27.595

This is what you should aspire

304

00:13:27.595 --> 00:13:30.635

to do within your organizations is continuous improvement

305

00:13:30.635 --> 00:13:32.185

of your safety management system.

306

00:13:34.075 --> 00:13:38.145

And the, the question is you getting results or

307

00:13:38.285 --> 00:13:40.195

or is it just window washing?

308

00:13:41.455 --> 00:13:42.875

And you see a lot of it, unfortunately.

309

00:13:43.215 --> 00:13:46.675

So just having an SMS doesn't make you safe.

310

00:13:47.705 --> 00:13:49.445

And I think we need to be tougher on ourselves,

311
00:13:49.445 --> 00:13:53.135
especially when we're auditing is, is being more critical,

312
00:13:53.545 --> 00:13:54.815
being more intrusive

313
00:13:54.875 --> 00:13:56.765
and looking, asking the tough questions.

314
00:13:57.665 --> 00:13:59.365
How well we're really doing in terms of,

315
00:14:01.425 --> 00:14:04.725
so now it's my distinct pleasure to introduce Rod Hutte.

316
00:14:05.045 --> 00:14:06.385
Now he's been a longstanding member

317
00:14:06.485 --> 00:14:07.905
of the flight test safety committee.

318
00:14:09.275 --> 00:14:10.895
My gosh, he's a two time winner.

319
00:14:10.975 --> 00:14:13.435
The Tony the Lavere flight test, safety War,

320
00:14:13.595 --> 00:14:15.275
about 2000 and 2008.

321
00:14:17.015 --> 00:14:18.275
He is test pilot.

322
00:14:18.615 --> 00:14:21.785
He an FAA designated engineering representative.

323
00:14:22.425 --> 00:14:24.345
I think he's been testing airplanes since the,

324
00:14:24.435 --> 00:14:25.505

there was still dope and fabric

325

00:14:25.525 --> 00:14:26.585
on the wings, I guess, right?

326

00:14:26.685 --> 00:14:28.995
Rod, sorry, where Arian on he is.

327

00:14:29.775 --> 00:14:33.305
Um, there he, sorry, uh,

328

00:14:33.405 --> 00:14:35.105
air Force Veteran Ego driver

329

00:14:35.725 --> 00:14:37.985
and, uh, boy, I think he taught at both, uh,

330

00:14:37.985 --> 00:14:39.385
test pilot at schools, air Force

331

00:14:39.605 --> 00:14:43.685
and National impressive Director of Safety at Edwards, uh,

332

00:14:44.325 --> 00:14:46.165
probably one of the, the plank owner authors

333

00:14:46.165 --> 00:14:47.285
of the 40 40 26.

334

00:14:47.345 --> 00:14:48.765
In getting the risk management process

335

00:14:49.415 --> 00:14:53.125
inculcated into a formal instruction that most of, uh, a lot

336

00:14:53.125 --> 00:14:56.885
of our OEM flight test organizations use in reference in our

337

00:14:56.885 --> 00:14:58.365
partnership for safety plan with our,

338

00:14:58.505 --> 00:15:02.055
our certifying agencies, one

339

00:15:02.055 --> 00:15:03.895
of the principal leads too in developing the flight test

340

00:15:03.895 --> 00:15:06.115
safety data.

341

00:15:06.115 --> 00:15:09.635
Very, very impressive. S that Rod, if you'd come on up

342

00:15:09.695 --> 00:15:12.195
and I'm gonna turn the reigns over to you for the after.