Thirty years ago, my high school still offered a typing class.  At the time, I convinced the principal of my small school to let me drop the class and add an elective math class.  His great concern was that I learn how to type.  I told him that I would install a "typing tutor" application on my computer with its 386 processor.  The software was "smart" enough to know what letters I could type and provide me additional exercises for those I had not mastered.  I mention this anecdote because it marked a transition in the way people learned knowledge and acquired skills.

As flight test professionals, we are at a similar crossroad.  Our ability to teach and train flight test and its related safety and risk management disciplines must adapt to the time we have available and accommodate the technology.  In 1989, software did not include machine learning or artificial intelligence--this is a topic I hope to address in the December issue, so if you would like to contribute, please contact the Flight Test Safety Committee, the Chairman, or the Editor, This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..  

This month, however, we present a broad survey of the ways that flight test education and training are changing, spreading, and ultimately adapting.  The articles herein are a snapshot of where we are today. They complement past issues that presented a more in depth look at specific innovations.  Ultimately, I hope they will inform the reader of the possibilities and inspire us to take advantage of the potential that lies before us.

Sincerely,
Mark Jones Jr.

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In 1999, Greg Lewis presented a paper to the Flight Test Society of Australia, "Flight Test Safety in Civil Certification," in which he describes unique risks and incidents that occurred during civil certification flight test with government test pilots.  One of the interesting facts in the paper is the first known reference (I think)--in a technical paper--to the FAA's Order 4040.26.  For some of us, it seems like the order always existed, but this paper reminds us that FAA's test safety guidance is relatively young, at least in its current form.  The other thing the paper describes is several flight test aircraft incidents.  The ability to recall incidents like this is important for flight test professionals, because it informs our intuition about the likelihood of the hazards we are assessing. It gives us data by which to assess the confidence of our probability estimates.  Or does it?

That is the question addressed herein -- how confident are we? 

The question may cause some to sweat, bringing memories of Comprehensive Oral exams at TPS or flashback of basic stats class from college, but the heuristics proposed herein should reduce the anxiety of the reader.  These rules will enable us, as a flight test community, to communicate about uncertainty even as we face more it in the years to come.

One last thing about Greg's paper: it's an excellent resource, and the FTSA recently generously shared it with members of our community. So get your hands on a copy and thank your colleagues down under

Finally, please continue to share this newsletter.  Let us know when you do, because we want to Reach Everyone (117%).  Send questions and comments to This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or any FTSC member.

Sincerely,
Mark Jones Jr.
Editor

For added security and convenience, you can download the newsletter here.

It has been almost two months since the Flight Test Safety Workshop, and you can now find video presentations from the workshop posted on the website: http://www.flighttestsafety.org/2019-charleston-sc.  As you may recall, the Workshop provided our community with a chance to discuss "Data to Assure Success."  As I began to watch the videos, I encountered an amusing interchange:

Person A: "Your slide said SMS requires no oversight..."

You could almost hear the confusion in his voice.

Person B: "Excuse me...my apologies. I speak Australian. What I meant was when you skip a step, you say it must have been an oversight, and we don't want any oversights.  With SMS, because we use methodical procedures, we won't overlook specific things."

As we can see, miscommunication happens even in the most mundane settings.  When we begin to discuss complexity and uncertainty, the risk of miscommunication increases.

To address this challenge, we reach back into the archive to revisit an old idea that we can apply to new problems.  The story contained herein illustrates a scenario where traditional statistical methods failed, and it lays the foundation for a future, more in-depth, discussion on "communicating uncertainty in flight test," an attempt to define heuristics for our community, to discuss both uncertainty and complexity in the days and years ahead.

Sincerely,
Mark Jones Jr.
Editor

For added security and convenience, you can download the newsletter here.